Miongoni mwa maswali muhimu kabisa yanayohusiana na hukmu, lile lenye kipaumbele na linalohitaji ufafanuzi, ni kujua ni nani hukmu inarejea kwake, yaani, ni nani Hākim? Juu ya kujua hili kunategemea kujua hukmu na aina zake. Lengo la 'hākim' hapa si mamlaka ya utendaji inayosimamia mambo yote kwa mamlaka iliyonayo. Bali lengo la hākim ni yule mwenye haki ya kutoa hukmu juu ya vitendo na mambo, kwa sababu kila kilichopo katika hali ya kuonekana kwa hisia kinajumuisha ama vitendo vya binadamu au mambo ambayo si vitendo vya binadamu. Binadamu, kwa sifa yake ya kuwa hai katika ulimwengu huu, ndiye mada ya utafiti, na utoaji wa hukmu upo kwa sababu yake tu na unamhusu yeye. Kwa hiyo, hukmu juu ya vitendo vya binadamu na juu ya mambo yanayohusiana na vitendo hivyo ni jambo la lazima. Basi ni nani peke yake mwenye haki ya kutoa hukmu juu ya hilo: ni Allah, au ni binadamu mwenyewe? Kwa maneno mengine, je, ni shar’ au ni akili [‘aql]? Kile kinachotuwezesha kujua hukmu ya Allah ni shar’, na kile ambacho binadamu hukihukumia ni akili. Je, basi, ni nani anayehukumu (juu ya vitendo na mambo): shar’ au akili?

Among the most important of inquiries related to the hukm, one of priority and requiring explanation, is the knowledge of who it is the issuing of the hukm returns to, that is, who is the hākim? Upon the knowledge of this rests the knowledge of the hukm and its types. The intent of ‘hākim’ here is not the executive authority who executes all the affairs with the authority it possesses. Rather, the intent of hākim is the one who possesses the right of issuing the hukm upon actions and things, because all that exists of the sensorially perceivable comprises either of the actions of the human or of the things which are other than the actions of the human. The human, by his description of being alive in this universe, is the subject of the study, and the issuing of the hukm is only because of him and is related to him. Therefore the hukm upon the actions of the human and upon the things related to these actions is necessary. Who then is the one who alone has the right to issue the hukm upon that: it is Allah, or the human himself? In other words, is it the shar’ or the intellect [‘aql]? That which allows us to know the hukm of Allah is the shar’, and that which the human judges by is the intellect. So what judges (upon the actions and things), the shar’ or the intellect?

Kwa upande wa matokeo ya hukm hii, yaani jambo linalotolewa kama hukm juu ya vitendo na vitu, ni husn [uzuri] na qubh [ubaya], kwa sababu lengo la "kutoa hukm" ni kubainisha msimamo wa binadamu kuhusu kitendo: je, afanye au aache, au achague kati ya kufanya na kuacha; na kubainisha msimamo wake kuhusu vitu vinavyohusiana na vitendo vyake: je, avitumie, au aviache, au achague kati ya kutumia na kuacha. Kubainika kwa msimamo wake huu kunategemea mtazamo wake kuhusu kitu hicho: je, ni hasan, au qabīh, au si chochote kati ya hivyo. Kwa hiyo, matokeo ya hukm inayotafutwa ni husn na qubh. Je, basi, hukm ya husn na qubh ni kwa ajili ya akili au kwa ajili ya shar'? Hakuna chaguo la tatu kuhusu kutolewa kwa hukm hii. Jibu ni kwamba hukm juu ya vitendo na vitu inaweza kuwa kutoka katika mitazamo kadhaa. Inaweza kuwa kutoka katika mtazamo wa uhalisia wake, au kutoka katika mtazamo wa kuendana au kutofautiana kwake na maumbile ya binadamu na mielekeo yake ya asili [fitri], au kutoka katika mtazamo wa kufanywa kwake kuwa jambo la kusifiwa na kuachwa kwake kuwa jambo la kulaumiwa, au kutokuwa kwake jambo la kusifiwa wala la kulaumiwa; yaani, kutoka katika mtazamo wa thawabu na adhabu kwa kufanya au kuacha, au kukosekana kwa thawabu au adhabu. Basi, hizi ni mitazamo mitatu ya hukm juu ya vitendo na vitu: kwanza, uhalisia wake, ni nini; pili, upatanifu wake, au kukosekana kwake, na maumbile ya binadamu; na tatu, kuhusu thawabu au adhabu, na sifa au lawama.

As for the result of this hukm, that is, the thing issued as a judgment upon the actions and the things, it is the husn [beauty] and the qubh [ugliness], because the intent of ‘issuing the hukm’ is the specifying of the stance of the human towards an action: should he do it or leave it, or choose between doing it and leaving it, and the specifying of his stance towards the things related to his actions: should he use them, or leave them, or choose between using and leaving. The specifying of this stance of his depends on his view about the thing: is it hasan or qabīh or neither. Thus the result of the sought hukm is the husn and qubh. So is the judgment of husn and qubh for the intellect or the shar’? There is no third option with regards to the issuing of this hukm. The answer to that is that the hukm on the actions and things can be from a number of perspectives. It can be from the perspective of its reality, or from the perspective of its accordance or discordance with the nature of the human being and his innate [fitri] inclinations, or from the perspective of its commission being praiseworthy and its omission being blameworthy or it being neither praiseworthy or blameworthy, that is, from the perspective of reward and punishment for its commission or omission or the lack of reward or punishment. Thus these are the three perspectives of the hukm upon the actions and things: one, their reality, what is it; two, their harmony, or the lack thereof, with the nature of the human; and three, with regards to reward or punishment and praise or reproach.

Kuhusu hukm juu ya mambo kwa mtazamo wa kwanza, yaani uhalisia wake, na kwa mtazamo wa pili, yaani upatano wake au mkinzano wake na maumbile ya binadamu, hakuna shaka kwamba haya yote ni kwa ajili ya binadamu mwenyewe, yaani kwa akili na si kwa shar'. Akili ndiyo inayohukumu juu ya vitendo na mambo kwa kuzingatia mitazamo hii miwili. Shar' haihukumu juu ya mojawapo kati yao, kwa sababu shar' haina nafasi katika hayo. Kwa mfano, elimu ni hasan na ujinga ni qabīh; uhalisia wa vyote viwili unaonekana katika ubora na upungufu wake mtawalia. Vivyo hivyo, utajiri ni hasan na umaskini ni qabīh, na kadhalika. Pia, kuwaokoa wanaozama ni hasan, na kuchukua mali kwa dhulma ni qabīh. Maumbile ya binadamu yanaelekea mbali na dhulma na yanaelekea kumwokoa aliye karibu kuangamia. Haya yote yanarejea kwenye uhalisia wa jambo ambalo binadamu anaweza kulitambua kwa hisia zake na ambalo akili yake inaweza kulielewa, au yanarejea kwenye maumbile ya asili ya binadamu ambayo kwayo anahisi na ambayo akili yake inayaelewa. Kwa hiyo ni akili inayohukumu kuhusu husn na qubh, si shar'. Yaani, kutolewa kwa hukm juu ya vitendo na mambo kwa mitazamo hii miwili ni kwa ajili ya binadamu; mwenye kuhukumu katika hayo ni binadamu.

As for the hukm upon things from the first perspective, their reality, and the second perspective, their harmony or discord with the nature of the human, then there is no doubt that all of this is for the human himself, that is, for the intellect and not the shar’. The intellect is what judges upon the actions and the things with regards to these two perspectives. The shar’ does not judge upon either of them, because the shar’ has no role in them. For example that knowledge is hasan and ignorance is qabīh; the reality of the two is apparent in their excellence and deficiency respectively. Similarly that affluence is hasan and poverty is qabīh, and so forth. Also that the rescuing of those drowning is hasan and the unjust taking of wealth is qabīh. Human nature inclines away from oppression and inclines towards the saving the one on the brink of destruction. All of these return to the reality of the thing which man can sensorially perceive and which his intellect can comprehend, or they return to the innate nature of man by which he feels and which his intellect comprehends. Therefore it is the intellect which judges with regards to husn and qubh, and not the shar’, that is, the issuing of the hukm upon actions and things from these two perspectives is for the human; the hakim in them is man.

Kuhusu hukumu juu ya vitendo na mambo kwa mtazamo wa sifa na lawama duniani, na thawabu na adhabu akhera, basi bila shaka ni kwa Allah peke yake, si kwa binadamu. Yaani ni kwa shar‘, si kwa akili. Kwa mfano: husn ya imani, qubh ya kufuru, husn ya utiifu, qubh ya uasi, husn ya kusema uongo wakati wa vita, na qubh yake kwa mtawala kafiri nje ya vita, na kadhalika. Hii ni kwa sababu hakika ya akili (fikra) ni kwamba inahitaji hisia [ihsās], hakika, taarifa zilizotangulia, na akili yenyewe. Hisia ni sehemu ya msingi wa vipengele vya akili, kiasi kwamba ikiwa binadamu hawezi kuhisi jambo, haiwezekani akili yake kutoa hukumu juu yake, kwa sababu hukumu ya akili imefungwa kwa kile kinachoweza kuhisiwa kwa hisi, na haiwezekani kutoa hukumu juu ya kisichoweza kuhisiwa kwa hisi. Asili ya dhulma, kama ni jambo linalostahili sifa au lawama, si miongoni mwa yale binadamu anayoweza kuyahisi kwa hisi, kwa kuwa si kitu kinachohisiwa kwa hisi. Kwa hiyo haiwezekani akili kuielewa na kutoa hukumu juu yake. Hata kama binadamu anaweza kuhisi, kwa maumbile yake, mvuto kuelekea nao au kuukimbia, lakini hisia peke yake haiwezi kusaidia akili kutoa hukumu ya jambo; bali hisia za kuhisi ni lazima. Kwa hiyo haiwezekani kwa akili kutoa hukumu ya husn au qubh juu ya jambo au kitendo. Hivyo, si halali kwa akili kutoa hukumu yake ya sifa au lawama juu ya vitendo au mambo.

As for the judgment upon the actions and things from the perspective of praise and reproach in the world, and reward and punishment in the hereafter, then without doubt it is for Allah alone, and not for the human, that is, it is for the shar’, not for the intellect. For example the husn of imān, the qubh of kufr, the husn of obedience, the qubh of disobedience, the husn of lying during war, and its qubh with the kafir ruler in other than war, and so forth. This is because the reality of the intellect (thinking) is (that it requires) sense-perception [ihsās], the reality, previous information and the mind. Sense-perception is an essential part of the elements of the intellect such that if the human being cannot perceive a thing it is not possible for his intellect to issue judgment upon it, because the judgment of the intellect is restricted to that which is sensorially-perceivable and it is not possible for it to issue judgment on that which is not sensorially-perceivable. The nature of oppression as to whether it is worthy of praise or reproach is not from that which man can sensorially perceive, because it is not something sensorially-perceivable, so the intellect understanding it and giving judgment on it is not possible. This even though man may feel, through his innate nature, an inclination towards or away from it, but feeling alone does not benefit the issuing by the intellect of the hukm upon a thing; nay, sense-perception is a must. Therefore, it is not possible for the intellect to issue judgment of husn or qubh upon a thing or action. Thus, it is not permissible for the intellect to issue its judgment of praise or reproach upon actions or things.

Pia haijuzu kuweka utoaji wa hukmu ya sifa au lawama kwa mwanadamu, wala kwa silika zake za asili, kwa sababu silika hizi hutoa hukmu ya sifa juu ya kile kinachoendana nazo, na ya lawama juu ya kile kinachopingana nazo. Huenda yale yanayoendana nazo yakawa miongoni mwa mambo yanayostahili lawama, kama zinaa, ushoga, na utumwa wa watu; na huenda yale yanayopingana nazo yakawa yanastahili sifa, kama kupigana na maadui, subira juu ya mambo yasiyopendwa, na kusema ukweli katika hali ambazo madhara makubwa yatatokea kwa hakika. Hivyo basi, kuweka utoaji wa hukmu pamoja na silika na matamanio ni kuyafanya kuwa msingi ambao sifa na lawama (za mambo na vitendo) hupimwa kwayo. Hakika haya ni msingi potofu wa kupima, na kwa hiyo kuhukumu kwa kuyatumia ni kosa, kwa sababu hufanya hukmu potofu zinazopingana na uhalisia, pamoja na ukweli kwamba hupima sifa na lawama kwa msingi wa matamanio na hisia, si kwa msingi wa kile kinachostahili kuwa. Kwa hiyo, si halali kwa silika za asili kutoa hukmu ya sifa au lawama, wala si halali kwa akili kufanya hivyo. Vivyo hivyo, si halali kuweka utoaji wa hukmu ya sifa au lawama kwa binadamu. Anayetoa hukmu yake ya sifa au lawama hakika ni Allah, wala si mwanadamu; ni Shari'a, wala si akili.

Nor is it permissible to place the issuing of the hukm of praise or reproach with the innate human inclinations because these inclinations issue the judgment of praise upon what is in accordance with them and of reproach on what goes against them, and it may be that that which accords with them is of that which is worthy of reproach, like fornication, homosexuality, and enslavement of people; and it be may that that which goes against them is praiseworthy, like fighting the enemies, patience upon disliked things and the speaking of the truth in situations where severe harm is bound to eventuate. Thus placing the (issuing) of the hukm with the inclinations and desires means placing them as a basis upon which praise and reproach (of things and actions) is considered. They are definitely an erroneous basis of consideration, and therefore judging by them is erroneous, because they make erroneous judgments that contradict the reality, over and above the fact that they judge praise and blame on the basis of whims and desires not on the basis of what it should be. Therefore it is not permissible for the innate inclinations to issue judgment of praise or reproach, nor is it permissible for the intellect to do so. Thus is it not permissible to place the issuing of the hukm of praise or reproach with the human being. The one who issues His hukm of praise or reproach is indeed Allah, and not man; it is the shar’, not the intellect.

Ikiwa mwanadamu ataachiwa kuhukumu matendo na mambo kwa upande wa sifa na lawama, hukumu hiyo itatofautiana kulingana na tofauti za haiba na nyakati. Haimo katika uwezo wa mwanadamu kuhukumu kwa uhakika. Kwa hiyo hukumu katika jambo hili ni ya Allah. Ni dhahiri kwamba mwanadamu huona jambo kuwa ni hasan leo, lakini kesho huliona kuwa ni qabīh; huona jambo kuwa ni qabīh jana, na leo huona jambo hilohilo kuwa ni hasan. Hivyo mwanadamu hutofautiana katika hukumu juu ya jambo lilelile, na hawezi kuhukumu kwa uhakika. Kwa hiyo hukumu yake ni yenye makosa, na kwa sababu hiyo haifai kuweka hukumu ya sifa au lawama kwa akili au kwa mwanadamu.

If man is left to judge upon actions and things with regards to praise and reproach, the judgment would differ with the difference in personalities and times. It is not in the capability of man to conclusively judge. Therefore the judgment in this regard is for Allah. It is evidently apparent that man judges things to be hasan today but then judges them to be qabīh tomorrow, that he judges things to be qabīh yesterday and judges the same things to be hasan today. Thus man is at variance in judgment upon the same thing and cannot conclusively judge. So his judgment is erroneous and therefore it is not permissible to place the judgment of praise or reproach with the intellect or with man.

Hivyo basi ni kwa lazima kwamba Hakimu juu ya vitendo vya waja, na juu ya mambo yanayohusiana nao kwa mtazamo wa sifa na lawama, ni Allah Mtukufu wala si binadamu; yaani, ni Shari' na si akili.

Thus it is from necessity that the Judge upon the actions of the servants and upon the things related to them from the perspective of praise and reproach is Allah the Exalted and not man, that is, it is the shar’ and not the intellect.

Hii ndiyo dalili ya kiakili ya husn na qubh; kwa upande wa dalili ya kishari'ah, basi Shari'ah imefunga tahsīn na taqbīh kwa amri yake ya kumfuata Mtume ﷺ na kwa lawama yake dhidi ya matamanio ya nafsi. Kwa hiyo imethibitika kwa uhakika kupitia Shari'ah kwamba husn ni kile ambacho Shari'ah imekifanya kuwa husn, na qabīh ni kile ambacho Shari'ah imekifanya kuwa qabīh, kwa mtazamo wa lawama na sifa.

This is the rational evidence of husn and qubh; as for the shar’i evidence, then the shar’ has tied tahsīn and taqbīh with its command to follow the Messenger and its reproach of the whims. Thus it is definitively established by the shari’ah that husn is what the shar’ has made husn and qabīh is what the shar’ has made qabīh, from the perspective of reproach and praise.

Hukm, yaani sifa ya kusifiwa au kulaumiwa, juu ya vitendo na vitu, ni kwa ajili ya kubainisha msimamo wa binadamu kuhusiana navyo. Kwa upande wa vitu, hukm hubainisha kama matumizi yake ni halali au haramu, bila uwezekano wa tatu. Kwa upande wa vitendo vya binadamu, hukm hubainisha kama kuvifanya au kuviacha ni lazima, au kama uchaguzi wa kufanya au kuacha ni wake. Kwa kuwa hukm kwa mtazamo huu si chochote isipokuwa kwa ajili ya Shar‘, ni lazima kwamba ahkām juu ya vitendo na vitu vinavyohusiana navyo zirejee kwa Shar‘ na si kwa akili, na ni lazima kwamba Shar‘ peke yake ndiye ahukumu juu yake.

The hukm, of praise or reproach, upon the actions and things is for the specifying of the stance of the human with regards to them. In terms of the things, it clarifies whether his using them is permissible or prohibited, there being no third possibility. In terms of the actions of man, it clarifies whether his establishing or leaving them is required, or whether the choice between doing and leaving is his. Because the hukm from this perspective is not but for the shar’ it is of necessity that the ahkām upon the actions and things related to them return to the shar’ and not the intellect and it is of necessity that the shar’ alone judge upon them.

Zaidi, hukumu juu ya vitu, ya halali [inayoruhusiwa] au haramu [iliyokatazwa], juu ya vitendo vya waja vinavyokuwa wajibu, haramu, mandubu [inayopendekezwa], makruhu [inayochukiza] au mubahu [inayoruhusiwa], na juu ya mambo ['umūr] na mikataba ['uqūd] (ya kuwa) sababu [asbāb], masharti [shurūt], au vizuizi [mawāni'], au sahihi [ṣaḥīḥ], batili [bāṭil], au fasidi [fāsid], au (ya kuwa) azimio [azīmah] au ruhusa [rukhṣah], yote haya hayahukumiwi kwa msingi wa vitu au vitendo kuwa vinaendana au kutoendana na maumbile ya kibinadamu, wala kwa msingi wa uhalisia wake, bali yanahukumiwa kwa msingi wa kama vinastahili sifa au lawama duniani, na thawabu au adhabu akhera. Kwa hiyo hukumu kwa asili yake ni ya Shariah peke yake, si ya akili. Hivyo basi, mwenye kuhukumu kwa uhalisia juu ya vitendo na vitu vinavyohusiana navyo, na juu ya mambo na mikataba, si yeyote ila Shariah peke yake. Akili haina hukumu yoyote kabisa katika jambo hili.

Further, the hukm upon the things, of halāl [permissible] or harām [prohibited], upon the actions of the servants of wājib [obligatory], harām, mandūb [recommended], makrūh [reprehensible] or mubāh [permissible], and upon the matters [‘umūr] and contracts [‘uqūd] of (them being) asbāb [causes], shurūt [conditions], or mawān’i [preventions], or sahīh [valid], bātil [invalid], or fāsid [void], or (them being) azimāh [original rule] or a rukhsah [concession], all of this is not judged on the basis of the things or actions being in accordance or discordance with the natural human disposition or on the basis of their reality, but are judged on the basis of whether they merit praise or reproach in this world and reward or punishment in the hereafter. Therefore the hukm by its nature is for the shar’ alone and not for the intellect. Thus the hākim in reality upon the actions and the things related to them and upon the matters and contracts is not but the shar’ alone. The intellect has absolutely no judgment in this.