Khalifa ni kiongozi mkuu wa Waislamu kwa lengo la kusimamisha hukumu za Shari'a za Kiislamu, na kubeba da'wah ya Kiislamu kwenda duniani. Kwa hiyo kusimamisha Shari'a na kubeba da'wah kwenda duniani ni mambo mawili ambayo kwa ajili yake cheo cha Ukhalifa kipo; kwa hiyo yote mawili ni kazi ya cheo cha Ukhalifa. Si sahihi kwa mtu yeyote kusimamia mambo hayo mawili isipokuwa Khalifa, wala si halali kwa Khalifa kumteua mtu mwingine atakayesimamia yote mawili badala yake, kwa sababu ndiyo mambo mawili ambayo bay'ah hutolewa juu yake, na mkataba wa bay'ah unafanyika juu ya nafsi yake. Kwa hiyo haruhusiwi kumwakilisha mtu mwingine kutekeleza kazi ambayo mkataba ulifanyika juu yake. Hii ni kwa sababu kila mkataba unaofanyika juu ya nafsi ya mkataji, kama vile mfanyakazi, wakala na mshirika, haruhusiwi kumwakilisha mtu mwingine kutekeleza kazi ambayo mkataba ulifanyika juu yake. Mkataba wa Ukhalifa unapofanyika juu ya mtu maalum, haruhusiwi mtu huyo kumwakilisha mtu mwingine kusimama mahali pake katika lile ambalo mkataba wa Ukhalifa ulifanyika juu ya nafsi yake, ambalo ni uongozi mkuu wa Waislamu wa kusimamisha hukumu za Shari'a na kubeba da'wah.

The Khalifah is the general leader of the Muslims in order to establish the Islamic Shar’a rules, and carry the Islamic da’wah to the world. So establishing the Shar’a and carrying the da’wah to the world are the two matters for the sake of which the post of the Khilafah exists; so both of them are the work of the post of the Khilafah. It is not correct for anyone to supervise them other than the Khalifah nor is it allowed for the Khalifah to establish someone who would supervise both of them instead of him because they are the two matters upon which the bay’ah is given and the bay’ah contract takes place upon his person. So he is not allowed to delegate someone else to perform the work upon which the contract took place. This is because each contract which occurred upon the contractor’s person like the employee, agent and partner it is not permitted for him to delegate someone else to perform the work over which the contract took place. When the Khilafah contract occurs upon a specific person, it is not allowed for this person to delegate someone else to stand in his place in what the Khilafah contract occurred upon his person, which is the general leadership of Muslims to establish the Shar’a rules and carry the da’wah.

Kwa hiyo hii inadhihirisha kwamba kubeba da'wah ndiyo sababu ya kuanzishwa kwa Khilafah, yaani kuwepo kwa Khilafah, kama ilivyo, ni kwa ajili ya kulitekeleza jukumu hilo. Haifai kwa mtu mwingine yeyote isipokuwa Khalifah kulisimamia, ingawa ni sahihi kwa kila Muslim kulitekeleza. Basi kubeba da'wah, ingawa ni wajibu kwa Waislamu wote na kila mtu mmoja mmoja anaweza kulitekeleza, bado hakuna anayeweza kulisimamia isipokuwa Khalifah.

Accordingly this clarifies that carrying the da’wah is what the Khilafah was established for i.e. the existence of the Khilafah, as it is, exists in order to perform. It is not permitted for other than the Khalifah to supervise it even though it is valid for each Muslim to perform it. Therefore the carrying of the da’wah, even if it is obligatory upon all Muslims and every individual can perform it; nevertheless, none can supervise it except the Khalifah.

Usimamizi wa Khalifah juu ya kubeba da'wah una njia maalum nayo ni jihad; na jihad haipo isipokuwa kwa kuwepo kwa mujahideen, nguvu iliyoandaliwa kwa ajili ya kupigana, na mapigano yenyewe. Kwa hiyo kuwepo kwa jeshi, maandalizi yake na kazi inayofanya ni njia ya kubeba da'wah kwa ulimwengu. Kwa mujibu wa hayo, ni Khalifah anayesimamia uongozi wa jeshi kwa kuwa yeye ndiye anayesimamia kubeba da'wah, hivyo ndiye anayesimamia jihad. Basi yeye, si mwingine yeyote, ndiye anayesimamia uongozi wa jeshi. Usimamizi wa uongozi wa jeshi si kuchukua uendeshaji wake, mafunzo yake, wala kushughulikia jambo lolote la kiufundi ndani yake; hayo yote ni mitindo na njia tu. Khalifah, ingawa anasimamia mambo yake kwa usimamizi wa jumla, hafanyi mambo hayo. Badala yake, kusimamia jeshi ni kusimamia uundaji wake, maandalizi yake, na kusimamia suala la kutekeleza kazi yake. Hii ni kwa sababu askari aliyeambatanishwa na jihad (yaani mujahid), nguvu iliyoandaliwa kuwatisha adui, na mapigano, vinachukuliwa kuwa ni matendo ya jihad; kwa hiyo Allah (swt) aliviamuru pale alipoamuru jihad; na mapigano yenyewe ni jihad. Hivyo, usimamizi wa mujahideen, mafunzo yao, na utekelezaji wao wa mapigano ni kwa Khalifah peke yake na si mwingine. Maana ya uongozi wa Khalifah juu ya jeshi ni kwamba yeye ndiye anayesimamia, si mwingine, upangaji wa sera zinazohusu kuunda jeshi, kuliandaa na kuliimarisha, na sera zinazohusu utekelezaji wa kazi yake, yaani mapigano. Pia ni kwamba yeye ndiye anayesimamia, si mwingine, usimamizi wa moja kwa moja wa utekelezaji wa sera hizi. Kwa hiyo ni Khalifah anayesimamia upangaji wa sera zote za kijeshi, za ndani na za nje, na upangaji wa sera ya vita, ndani na nje; na si sahihi kabisa kwa mtu mwingine yeyote kusimamia hili. Ndiyo, inaruhusiwa kwake kuomba msaada kutoka kwa yeyote anayemtaka katika kupanga sera hii na kusimamia utekelezaji wake, lakini hairuhusiwi kabisa kumwachia mtu mwingine kuisimamia. Hii ndiyo maana ya usimamizi wa Khalifah juu ya uongozi wa jeshi. Hairuhusiwi kwa mtu mwingine asiyekuwa Khalifah kusimamia uongozi huu kwa namna yoyote ile.

The Khalifah’s supervision of the carrying of the da’wah has a specific method which is jihad; and jihad only exists with the presence of the mujahideen, the power which is prepared for fighting and the fighting itself. Therefore the existence of the army, its preparation and the work which it performs is the method of carrying of the da’wah to the world. Accordingly it is the Khalifah who supervises the leadership of the army since he is the one who supervises the carrying of the da’wah so he is the one who supervises the jihad. So he, not any other, supervises the leadership of the army. The supervision of the army leadership is not undertaking its administration, training or undertaking any technical matter within this rather these are all styles and means. The Khalifah, even though he supervises its affairs with a general supervision, does not perform this. Rather supervising the army is supervising its formation, preparation and supervising the matter of undertaking its work. This is because the soldier who is attached to jihad (i.e.) the mujahid, the strength prepared to terrorise the enemy and the fighting are considered of the actions of jihad so accordingly Allah (swt) commanded them when He commanded the jihad; and the fighting itself is jihad. Therefore the supervision of the mujahideen, their training, and their performing the fighting is only for the Khalifah and no one else. So the meaning of the Khalifah’s leadership of the army is that he supervises, not anyone else, the planning of policy related to creating the army, preparing and strengthening it, and the policy related to its performing its work i.e. fighting. And (also) that he supervises, not anyone else, the direct supervision of the execution of this policy. Therefore it is the Khalifah who supervises planning all military policy, internal and external, and planning the war policy, internally and externally; and it is absolutely not correct for anyone else to supervise this. Yes, it is permitted for him to seek assistance from whoever he wishes in planning this policy and supervising its execution, but he is absolutely not allowed to leave someone else to supervise it. This is the meaning of the Khalifah’s supervision of the army’s leadership. It is not allowed for other than the Khalifah to supervise this leadership in any way whatsoever.

Kuna maswali mawili yanayotokana na nafasi ya jeshi lenyewe, kutokana na kwamba ni nguvu ambayo kwayo jihadi hufanywa katika hali yake ya kuwa njia pekee ya usimamizi wa Khalifah wa kubeba da'wah, na kutokana na kwamba ni nguvu inayosimama kulinda mamlaka ya Khilafah, yaani Dola, ndani na nje. Kuhusu swali linalotokana na nafasi ya jeshi kwa kuwa ni nguvu ambayo kwayo jihadi hufanywa katika hali yake ya kuwa ni njia inayosimamiwa na Khalifah katika kubeba da'wah, hili ni swali linalohusiana na sera ya nje ya Dola, ambamo jeshi na mambo ya kijeshi hayana nafasi. Hii ni kwa sababu sera ya nje ya Dola ya Kiislamu imejengwa juu ya kubeba da'wah kwa ulimwengu, na kwa kuwa njia ya usimamizi wa Khalifah wa kubeba da'wah imo katika jihadi tu, basi Dola ya Kiislamu iko katika hali ya jihadi ya kudumu. Kwa hiyo Ummah wote wa Kiislamu unaamini kwamba vita kati yake na Dola nyingine zote vinawezekana wakati wowote, na kwamba sera ya Dola lazima iwe juu ya maandalizi endelevu ya jihadi. Kwa kuwa kupigana kivitendo hakuruhusiwi isipokuwa baada ya kwanza kuwafikishia da'wah ya Kiislamu kwa namna inayovutia umakini, basi sera ya Dola ya Kiislamu inalenga kuunda hali kati yake na Dola nyingine itakayowezesha kufikisha Uislamu kwa watu na mataifa kwa namna inayovutia umakini; na hilo linategemea maandalizi ya kuingia vitani wakati wowote endapo kubeba da'wah kutahitaji hivyo. Kuunda hali inayowezesha kufikisha fikra na hukumu za Kiislamu kwa namna inayovutia umakini ni jambo lisiloepukika, kwani ni mojawapo ya kanuni za jihadi na sharti la msingi la kuanzisha mapigano kivitendo. Kwa hiyo ni wajibu kwa Khalifah kuunda hali hii, na inamlazimu kutumia juhudi zote za uwezo wake katika kuiunda. Anapaswa kutumia kiasi chochote cha fedha kinachohitajika ili kuunda nguvu hiyo, kama vile anavyopaswa kupitia hatari ili kushinda, kulinda nguvu ya Uislamu au kulinda amana takatifu ya Waislamu. Kwa hiyo, kuongeza nguvu za kijeshi, kuzingatia kwa makini maandalizi ya kijeshi na kuzingatia kikamilifu tathmini za kijeshi ni mambo ya msingi katika kuunda hali hii na kuihifadhi, kwa kuwa nguvu za kijeshi ndizo kinga pekee dhidi ya nguvu za kikafiri na nchi za kikafiri. Hii ndiyo inayolipa jeshi au nguvu za kijeshi athari katika usimamizi wa Khalifah katika kueneza da'wah; maana yake ni kwamba jeshi na nguvu zenye silaha zina ushawishi katika sera ya nje, kwani ndizo nguzo zake, na kutoka hapo ndipo hatari inapotokea kwa sera ya nje, yaani katika usimamizi wa Khalifah juu ya kueneza da'wah. Kwa hiyo, ni wajibu kuelewa uhalisia wa jambo hili kuhusu athari ya jeshi katika usimamizi wa Khalifah wa kueneza da'wah, yaani kuhusu hatari ya hili kwa sera ya nje ya Dola. Iwapo hatari hii haitaeleweka kwa uhalisia wake, itasababisha kusimama kwa kueneza da'wah kwa ulimwengu au mkanganyiko na kuporomoka kwa sera ya nje. Kujenga nguvu za kijeshi za Dola ya Kiislamu si maandalizi ya kujihami tu; bali ni jambo la lazima lisiloepukika ili Khalifah aweze kutekeleza yale ambayo Waislamu wamemwapia, yaani ili Dola itekeleze yale aliyoiwajibisha Allah (swt), ambayo ni kueneza da'wah. Au, kwa maneno mengine, ili Dola itekeleze sera yake ya nje kwa namna Allah (swt) aliyoiwajibisha, na kuihifadhi sera hii iendelee kusonga kwa usahihi na kwa tija. Kwa hiyo, kujenga nguvu za kijeshi, pamoja na kuwa ndiyo silaha pekee aliyonayo Ummah dhidi ya hofu ya makafiri wanaopigana na shambulio linalowezekana kutoka kwao, ni njia pekee ya kufanya sera ya nje ya Dola kuwa sera ya Kiislamu.

Hata hivyo, ingawa Dola ya Kiislamu kwa lazima inapaswa kujenga nguvu za kijeshi kupitia mfumo imara wa kijeshi, hii haimaanishi kwamba mazingatio ya kijeshi yanatawala sera ya nje ya Dola, wala kwamba mfumo wa kijeshi una ushawishi, mkubwa au mdogo, juu ya sera ya nje. Hii ni kwa sababu maoni ya kijeshi ni maoni ya taaluma maalum yanayotoka kwa wale ambao kazi yao ni kuihakikishia Dola ubora wa kijeshi endapo vita vitatokea kati yake na Dola nyingine. Kwa kawaida na kiutendaji, maoni yao yanajumuisha tahadhari zote; lakini haifai kwake kuzidi katika kuzingatiwa kwake kuwa ni ushauri tu; wala haifai kuzidi kuwa ushauri wa watu wa taaluma maalum ambao fikra zao hazizidi upande maalum katika jambo hili. Kwa hiyo si sahihi kufuata ushauri huu katika kila jambo, dogo au kubwa; wala si sahihi kuutafakari isipokuwa mahali unapochukua katika utafiti wa jumla wa sera ya nje. Unakubaliwa kwa utaalamu wake wa kiufundi tu, hivyo unachukuliwa pale ni utaalamu wake wa kiufundi, na kinachochukuliwa ndani yake kwa nafasi yake katika sera ya nje; ni ushauri na si shauriano. Yaani, Khalifah anautafuta anapochunguza sera ya nje, na inaruhusiwa kuusikiliza unapotolewa kwa ajili ya kusikilizwa tu, kwa sharti kwamba ni katika hali ya kuzingatia kwa makini sera ya nje na kuzingatia kwa makini nafasi ya ushauri huu katika maamuzi ya sera ya nje. Hairuhusiwi kuupa heshima kubwa zaidi ya hapo. Hii ni kwa sababu asipofanya hivyo, na kuupa uzito mkubwa zaidi kuliko kuwa ushauri tu, bila shaka kutakuwa na hatari kwa sera ya nje; ama kuchanganyikiwa au kuporomoka kwa sera ya nje, au kusimama kwa kubeba da'wah. Bali inaweza kuwa zaidi ya hayo, kwani inaweza kusababisha kuporomoka kwa Dola na kuzingirwa kutoka eneo ambalo mamlaka yake yanaenea. Kwa hiyo haijuzu kumpa maoni ya kijeshi uzito zaidi ya kuwa ni ushauri tu.

However even though the Islamic State is inevitably obliged to build military strength via a strong military apparatus, this does not mean that military considerations dominate over the State’s foreign policy nor that the military apparatus has influence, whether big or small, over the foreign policy. This is because the military opinion is an opinion by a specific profession emanating from those whose job is to guarantee the State a military excellence if war occurs between it and other States. Naturally and practically, their opinion encompasses all precautions; but it is not permitted that it exceeds in its consideration as being advice only; nor is it permitted to exceed being the advice of persons in a specific profession whose thought does not exceed a specific aspect in this subject. Accordingly it is not correct to follow this advice in everything, small or large; nor is it correct to study it except in the place it occupies in a general study of foreign policy. It is adopted in its technical expertise only, so it is taken when it is its technical expertise and what is taken within it in its place in the foreign policy; it is advice and not consultation. That is, the Khalifah seeks it when he studies foreign policy and it is permitted to listen to it when it is said for mere listening on condition that it is in the situation of careful attention to the foreign policy and careful attention to the place of this advice in the resolutions of the foreign policy. It is it allowed to give it more (regard) than that. This is because if he does not do this, and gives it greater consideration than it being mere advice, there will without any doubt be danger to the foreign policy; either confusion or tumbling down in the foreign policy or the halting of the carrying of the da’wah. Infact, there could be more than that as there could result tumbling down of the State and siege from the area upon which its authority is spread. Therefore it is not allowed to give the military opinion more (regard) than being merely advice.

Wanajeshi wanapotekeleza kazi zao kwa uwezo wao wa kijeshi, wanazitekeleza kama watu wenye utaalamu. Hawaruhusu katika mazingatio yao kunufaika na maoni ya umma wa dunia, wala kama wito wa Uislamu umefikishwa kwa namna inayovutia umakini; na pia athari yao katika kukabiliana na adui. Hawajaribu kuweka katika vipimo vyao nguvu kubwa zinazowezekana za kiroho na kimaadili; wala hawajali kuelewa matendo ya wabebaji wa da'wah wanaoishi katika ardhi za adui au wanaoenda huko kwa da'wah. Hawaelewi njia za kidiplomasia wala thamani kubwa ya ushawishi wa vitendo vya kisiasa. Kwa sababu hiyo, fikra za kijeshi ni fikra za kibinafsi na si fikra kamili za kisiasa. Ikiwa ushauri wao utachukuliwa, ni ushauri wenye thamani katika mada yake, lakini ikiwa watapewa mamlaka ya kutekeleza na kuamua, na ikiwa ushauri wao utakuwa na aina yoyote ya shinikizo, hili bila shaka litadhuru utulivu na mwenendo wa kisiasa. Kwa hiyo haijuzu kuruhusu chombo cha kijeshi kuwa na ushawishi katika siasa za nje, na maoni ya kijeshi hayapaswi kuchukua nafasi inayozidi kuwa ushauri wa kiufundi tu, si ushauri wa jumla.

When soldiers fulfil their work in their military capacity, they fulfil it as people of expertise. They do not permit into their considerations the benefiting from world public opinion or whether the invitation to Islam has been conveyed in a manner capturing attention; and their influence in meeting the enemy. They do not attempt to take into their measurements the redoubtable possibilities in the spiritual and morale strength; nor do they take concern to understand the actions of the da’wah carriers who live in the enemy lands or who go there for da’wah. They do not understand diplomatic means or the great influencing value of political actions. Due to this, military thinking is a subjective thought and not comprehensive political thinking. If their advice is taken it is valuable advice in its subject, but if they are given the authority of action and resolution, and if their advice has any type of compulsion this will without doubt cause harm to political steadiness and conduct. Therefore it is not allowed to permit the military apparatus to have influence in the foreign policy and the military opinions do not occupy a place exceeding their being no more than mere technical advice, not being general advice.

Hata hivyo, kuweka nafasi ya maoni ya askari kuwa ushauri wa kitaalamu tu hakumaanishi kupuuza tathmini za kijeshi; maana yake ni kwamba Khalifah lazima afanye tathmini zake ziwe na nguvu kuliko tathmini za kijeshi. Ni wajibu wake, anapopanga mpango wa mwisho, awe tayari kubeba jukumu hilo kwa kupuuza tathmini za kijeshi pekee wakati fulani. Lazima aziweke tathmini za wasio askari, kama wasaidizi (mua'winin), magavana, watu wenye ushawishi na wanachuoni, kuwa na uzito zaidi kuliko tathmini za kijeshi; hata hivyo Khalifah lazima athamini nafasi ya maafisa wa ngazi za juu wa jeshi katika Dola, iwe kwa upande wa kulinda ardhi au kuanzisha jihadi dhidi ya makafiri. Kwa hiyo ni wajibu kwake yeye na Ummah wote kuhifadhi nguvu ya kijeshi kama vile mtu binafsi anavyohifadhi zawadi ya macho yake. Hata hivyo ni wanasiasa, si askari, ndio wanaotawala upangaji wa sera ya nje, na wao ndio wanaoamua jinsi ya kujiandaa kukabiliana na hatari za vita, wakati gani waingie vitani endapo vita vitatokea, na vitakapotokea, vitaanza kwa kasi gani na lini. Ni wajibu wa Khalifah daima kufanya nguvu ya kijeshi kuwa idara inayofuata, na pia kutoruhusu chombo cha kijeshi, wala mtu yeyote binafsi, kuvuka nafasi ya kufuata sera.

However, restricting the place of soldiers’ opinions to being mere technical advice does not mean neglecting military evaluations; rather its meaning is only that the Khalifah must make his evaluations dominant over military evaluations. It is upon him, when he plans the final plan to be ready in bearing the responsibility by ignoring purely military evaluations at certain times. He must make the evaluations of non-soldiers such as the assistants (mua’winin), governors, people of influence and scholars as more (worthy) than military evaluations; nevertheless the Khalifah must value the position of high ranking soldiers in the State, whether in respect of defending the land or initiating jihad with the disbelievers. Therefore it is obligatory upon him and the whole Ummah to preserve military strength just like the individual preserves the gift of his eye(s). However it is the politicians, not the soldiers, who dominate the planning of foreign policy and they are the ones to resolve how to prepare to face the dangers of war, when should they enter into war if it occurs and when this occurs how quickly and when. It is obligatory upon the Khalifah to always make the military power a following department and also not to allow the military apparatus, or any individual, to exceed the role of the following policy.

Hii inahusu nafasi ya chombo cha kijeshi na maoni yake. Kuhusu jinsi Khalifah anavyotathmini tathmini za kijeshi, haitoshi kuzichukulia kama ushauri wa kiufundi tu kisha kuziruhusu tathmini za kijeshi ziwe na ushawishi katika maamuzi yake ya sera ya nje. Badala yake, tathmini za kijeshi lazima zichukuliwe kama ushauri tu, na haiwezekani kwamba ushauri huu uwe na ushawishi juu ya sera ya nje, yaani, hairuhusiwi kwake kuweka sera ya nje juu yake au kwamba uwe na athari yenye nguvu juu yake. Ni haramu tathmini za kijeshi kutawala sera ya nje; badala yake, ni wajibu kuziweka tathmini za kijeshi pembezoni mwa sera ya nje ya Dola. Tathmini za kijeshi lazima zibaki, kwa kuwa ni tathmini za kijeshi, iwe zinatoka kwa wanajeshi au raia, mbali na kumshawishi Khalifah wakati anapopanga sera ya nje.

This is in relation to the role of the military apparatus and its opinions. As for how the Khalifah evaluates military evaluations, it is not sufficient to adopt them as no more than mere technical advices then give military evaluations an influence in his decisions on the foreign policy. Rather military evaluations must be considered as mere advise, and it impossible that there is influence of this advice on the foreign policy i.e. it is not allowed for him to base the foreign policy upon it or that it has an effective impact over it. It is forbidden that military evaluations dominate the foreign policy; rather it is obligatory to leave military evaluations at the margin of the State’s foreign policy. Military evaluations must remain, in their being military evaluations whether emanating from soldiers or civilians in a place distant from influencing the Khalifah when he plans the foreign policy.

Mambo ya kijeshi huchukua umbo linaloonekana na la kimwili. Ukiweza kuona mizinga, meli za kijeshi, ndege, kambi, mabomu ya nyuklia na makombora; na ukiweza kushawishika kwa urahisi na bila shida kuhusu athari zake katika ushindi au kushindwa katika ushindi wa maeneo au katika kuzingirwa, kusonga mbele au kurudi nyuma, hizi ni vitu vya kimwili ambavyo vipimo vyake vinaweza kupimwa; vina athari ya kimwili ambayo matokeo yake yanaweza kuhisiwa. Hili ni tofauti na nguvu ya kiroho na ya ari, pamoja na ujanja wa kisiasa na maoni ya umma wa kikanda na kimataifa, kwani hayo si mambo ya kimwili. Si rahisi kuelewa athari zake na kuhisi matokeo yake kwa kuwa ni mambo yasiyoonekana, yasiyohisika, ingawa ni muhimu sana na yana uhai mkubwa zaidi katika sera za nje na hata katika vita na ushindi. Kwa hiyo, tathmini za kijeshi lazima zibaki pembezoni mwa sera za nje ili zibaki za pili hapo, ilhali nguvu ya kiroho inakuja kwanza, kisha nguvu ya ari inatawala. Ujanja na hila za kisiasa lazima ziwe na nafasi kubwa katika tathmini, na yote haya yakusanywe pamoja katika nguvu moja ya kisiasa iliyoungana, isiyogawanywa, inayosimamiwa na Khalifah mmoja. Kutokana na hili tunaweza kuelewa maana tatu za usimamizi wa Khalifah juu ya uongozi wa jeshi peke yake na kwa vitendo, na hatari ya kukabidhi jeshi uongozi rasmi au amri kuu, kama ilivyokuja kwa mujibu wa baadhi ya kauli.

Military matters take a distinct tangible form. If you are able to see cannons, military ships, planes, bases, nuclear bombs and missiles; and you are able to be convinced easily and without difficulty about their influence in success or defeat in conquest or siege, advance or retreat. These are material things whos dimensions can be measured; they have a material influence whose results are possible to be sensed. This is opposite to spiritual and morale strength, and political manoeuvring and regional and world public opinion as these are not material matters. It is not easy to understand their influence and sense their results since they are intangible things, unseen and unsensed though they are very important and of higher vitality in foreign policy and even in war and conquest. Therefore military evaluations must remain at the margin of foreign policy so as to remain secondary there in whereas spiritual strength comes first and then the morale strength is dominant. Political manoeuvrings and subtleties must have a prominent place in evaluation, and that all these should be collected together in a united political strength which is not subjected to separation, supervised by one Khalifah. From this we can understand three meanings of the Khalifah’s supervision of the army leadership solely and practically, and the danger of giving the army formal leadership or supreme command as has come according to some expressions.

Kutoa tathmini za kijeshi kutawala sera ya nje, kama ilivyofanywa na baadhi ya Makhalifa, kulikuwa na athari mbaya sana, kwani kulisababisha kusimamishwa kwa kufikisha da'wah duniani katika kipindi cha pili cha zama za Abbasi na mwisho wa zama za Waothmani. Ushindi wa Kiislamu ulisimama katika ardhi ya Kirumi kwenye mipaka ya ardhi za Kituruki upande wa Bilad Ash-Sham, na huko Ulaya Magharibi walirudi nyuma kutoka Ufaransa na kusimama kwenye mipaka ya Uhispania, ingawa nguvu ya kiroho ilibaki imara na fikra za Kiislamu zilikuwa katika zama za kujikusanya na kuimarisha. Hata hivyo, askari walipokuwa wakitoa maoni yao kuhusu nguvu zao na nguvu za adui, na kufanya maoni haya kuwa jambo la kwanza kuzingatiwa katika kuingia vitani au kutoingia, uamuzi wa mwisho ulikuwa ni kampeni za kiangazi na kipupwe, ili jihadi ibaki ikifanya kazi kulingana na kanuni za Shari'a bila kupita hapo na kuwa vitendo vya kisiasa au tathmini za kisiasa. Katika siku za Waothmani, majeshi ya Kiislamu yalifika kwenye kuta za Vienna nchini Austria baada ya kuyapitia Ulaya, ikiwemo Ugiriki, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania na Yugoslavia, hivyo mamlaka ya Uislamu ikaenea katika maeneo haya yote. Hadi maoni ya umma barani Ulaya yakawa kwamba jeshi la Kiislamu haliwezi kushindwa. Tathmini za kijeshi zilipotawala sera ya nje kama matokeo ya mapinduzi ya viwanda yaliyotokea Ulaya katika karne ya kumi na nane Miladi, kuenea kwa Uislamu kulisimama na kuanza kupungua, jambo lililopelekea kuangamizwa kabisa kwa mamlaka ya Uislamu.

Making military evaluations dominant over foreign policy as was done by some Khulafaa had a terrible influence leading to halting the carrying of the da’wah to the world in the second period of the Abbasid age and the end of the Ottoman age. Islamic conquests stopped in the Roman land at the limits of Turkish lands in the side of Bilad AsSham, and in Western Europe they retreated from France and stopped at the Spanish borders despite the fact that the spiritual energy remained strong and Islamic thoughts were in the age of concentration and consolidation. However, when soldiers would give their opinions about their strength and the enemy’s strength, and made these opinions the first consideration in entering war or not, the deciding decision was the summer and winter campaigns so that jihad remained existing in working according to the Shar’a rules without going beyond this to be political actions or political evaluations. In the days of the Ottomans, the Islamic armies reached the walls of Vienna in Austria after sweeping Europe including Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia so that the authority of Islam spread over all these quarters. Until the public opinion in Europe was that the Islamic army could not be conquered. When military evaluations dominated foreign policy as an effect of the industrial revolution which occurred in Europe in the eighteenth century CE, the spread of Islam stopped and the ebb began which led to the complete destruction of the authority of Islam.

Hii ni kwa kadiri jeshi ni nguvu ambayo kwayo jihadi hufanywa. Kuhusu kuwa ni nguvu inayosimama kulinda mamlaka ndani na nje, hili linahusiana na nguvu ya kimwili kwa maana kwamba ni uhai wa mamlaka, yaani utawala. Ndiyo inayoulinda, na ina uwezo wa kuuharibu na uwezo wa kuuanzisha, ingawa kwa muda tu. Kwa hiyo nafasi ya jeshi na vikosi vya silaha ni nafasi muhimu ndani ya mamlaka kwa asili yake kama mamlaka. Hili linamfanya mtu adhani kwamba jeshi lina ushawishi mkubwa katika mamlaka; lakini ukweli ni kwamba, hata likiruhusiwa kwa tathmini za kijeshi kuwepo katika sera za nje kwa kuchukua ushauri wao, hairuhusiwi kwa hali yoyote kwa chombo cha kijeshi wala kwa mtu yeyote ndani yake kuwa na uwepo katika mamlaka zaidi ya kuwa askari tu. Hii ni kwa sababu mamlaka, hata kama inalindwa na chombo cha kijeshi, hakuna nafasi ya askari ndani yake. Mamlaka si nguvu ya kimwili inayoonekana wala inayotegemea nguvu ya kimwili; bali hutekeleza tu mfumo wa mahusiano katika jamii, na hutegemea Ummah au watu kwa kuwa imefichika kwa uhalisia ndani yao, au sehemu yenye nguvu zaidi miongoni mwao. Askari na chombo cha kijeshi hawana uhusiano nao. Ndiyo, askari hushiriki katika utekelezaji, na haiwezekani kuwepo bila nguvu ya kimwili, yaani bila askari, lakini nafasi yao ndani yake ni nafasi ya chombo tu na si kitu kingine. Hairuhusiwi nafasi yao katika utekelezaji kuzidi nafasi ya bunduki mkononi mwa askari anapofyatua risasi kwa adui; yaani (bunduki) haina kabisa mapenzi wala maoni yake yenyewe kuhusu hilo. Ni hatari kwa hukm (utawala wa sheria) kuwa na askari ndani ya mamlaka, yaani ndani ya utawala, katika hali yoyote ile. Kwa hakika, wajibu wowote walio nao ndani yake, hata kidogo, utaifanya kuwa dola ya kipolisi, kama wajibu wa maafisa wa polisi (kuhusiana) na wafungwa, si mamlaka inayotekeleza upangaji wa mahusiano.

This is in as far as the army is the power with which jihad is performed. As for it being the power which stands to preserve the authority internally and externally, this is related to the material power in respect of it being the authority’s life i.e. the rule. It is the one which protects it, and it has the potential to destroy it and the potential to establish it, though only temporarily. Therefore the place of the army and armed forces is an important place in the authority in its essence as an authority. This inspires (one) that the army has a large influence in the authority; however, the reality is that even if it allowed for the military evaluations to have a presence in foreign policy in relation to taking their advice, it is not allowed in any situation for the military apparatus nor for any individual within it to have a presence in the authority more than his being a soldier. This is because the authority, even if it is preserved by the military apparatus, there is no presence for soldiers within it. The authority is not a tangible material power or dependent upon material power; rather it only executes (tanfeedh) the system of relationships in the society and depends upon the Ummah or people since it is concealed in reality within them, or the stronger section among them. Soldiers and the military apparatus have no relationship with them. Yes, soldiers do undertake the execution and it cannot possibly exist without material power i.e. without soldiers, but their role in it is the role of a tool and nothing else. It is not allowed for their role in execution to exceed the role of a gun in a soldier’s hand when he fires upon the enemy; i.e. (the gun) has absolutely no will nor its own opinion regarding that. It is dangerous for the rule (hukm) to have soldiers in the authority i.e. the rule in any situation whatsoever. Verily any role for them within it, however little, will make it a police state like the role of the police officers (in relation) to prisoners, not an authority which executes the organising of relationships.

Jukumu lolote kwa wanajeshi ndani ya mamlaka, hata likiwa dogo kiasi gani, litakuwa hatari kwa utawala, kwa mtawala na kwa chombo cha Dola. Hii ni kwa sababu utawala ndani yake unafaa zaidi kwa ukweli, ndani yake kuna kizuizi cha Shari'a, na ndani yake haki inatekelezwa. Haizingatii nguvu ya kimwili kuhusiana na utawala, si kwa mtawala wala kwa watawaliwa. Nguvu yake imefichika katika kuona kwake mambo ya watu na raia wake, si kwa sababu ya zana za utekelezaji alizonazo. Ikiwa nguvu ya kimwili itakuwepo ndani yake, itaharibu asili yake kama utawala na kuigeuza kuwa mamlaka kamili ya kiimla na utawala tu; hapo uhalisia wa utawala na mamlaka unakoma kuwepo. Kwa hiyo, hairuhusiwi kwa wanajeshi na vyombo vya kijeshi kuwa na uwepo wowote ndani yake; badala yake wanapaswa kubaki zana mikononi mwa mtawala, bila uhuru wowote wa kuamua au kutoa maoni katika utawala, bali wawe zana tu zisizo na sauti, zisizo na chochote kinachohusiana na mapenzi, maoni n.k. Hii ni kuhusiana na hatari yake kwa kiini cha utawala. Kuhusu hatari yake kwa mtawala, vyombo vya kijeshi na wanajeshi ni wanadamu ambao ndani yao mna silika ya kujihifadhi, ambayo mojawapo ya dhihirisho zake muhimu zaidi ni uongozi. Wakiachwa wawe na uwepo katika utawala, na wakajiona wanaweza kumwangamiza mtawala na kwamba wao ndio wanaomlinda yeye na mamlaka yake, wataamini kwamba wao ndio msingi wa mamlaka na kwamba mamlaka ya mtawala inategemea wao. Hili litaamsha ndani yao hisia ya uongozi na kuiongeza; pia nguvu ya kimwili iko mikononi mwao, hivyo watamchukulia utawala kwa nguvu. Kwa hiyo ni hatari ya janga kwa mtawala kuruhusu vyombo vya kijeshi au wanajeshi uwepo wowote katika mamlaka. Hili lilitokea katika Dola ya Kiislamu wakati wa Abbasi na Waothmani. Baadhi ya Makhalifa walidhoofika mbele ya wanajeshi, na haukupita muda mrefu kabla ya kuwapindua au kuwageuza kuwa zana mikononi mwao. Matokeo ya hili yalikuwa ni kudhoofika kulikotokea katika utawala wa Dola ya Kiislamu wakati wa siku za Makhalifa hawa.

Any role that exists for soldiers in the authority, however small, will be a danger to the rule, the ruler and the State’s entity. This is because the rule within it is more appropriate for truth, within it there is restriction to the Shar’a and in it justice is realized. It pays no consideration to material power in relation to the rule, neither for the ruler nor the ruled. Its strength is hidden in its perception of the affairs of the people and its citizens, not due to the tools of execution it has. If the material power exists within it, it will spoil its nature as rule and transform it into mere absolute authority and domination; at this point there ceases to exist the reality of the rule and authority.. Accordingly it is not allowed for soldiers and the military apparatus to have any presence within it; rather they must remain tools in the hands of the ruler with absolutely no free will in the rule or opinion but rather mere dumb tools devoid of all that is related to will, opinion etc. This is in relation to its danger to the essence of the rule. As for its danger to the ruler, the military apparatus and soldiers are men within whom is the survival instinct, one of whose most important manifestations is leadership. If they are left to have a presence in the rule, and they see themselves as able to destroy the ruler and that they preserve him and his authority, they will imagine that they are the basis of authority and that upon them depends the ruler’s authority. This will agitate within them the sensation of leadership and add to it; also the material power is in their hands so they will take the rule by force from him. Therefore it is a calamitous danger for the ruler to allow the military apparatus or soldiers any presence in the authority. This occurred in the Islamic State in the time of the Abbasids and Ottomans. Some of the Khulafaa became weak in front of the soldiers, and it was not long before they overthrew them or made them tools in their hands. A result of this was the decline which occurred in the rule of the Islamic State in the days of these Khulafaa.

Kuhusu hatari ya uwepo wowote wa jeshi katika utawala wa taasisi ya Ummah na taasisi ya Dola, Dola ya Kiislamu, kwa sababu ya asili ya fikra inayoibeba, imezungukwa na maadui. Hukumu ya Shari'ah ambayo Dola na Ummah lazima wayafuate ni kwamba dunia yote ni either nchi ya Kiislamu au nchi ya vita. Nchi zinazotawaliwa kwa Uislamu na bendera ya Kiislamu inazifunika ni nchi ya Kiislamu; kila kitu kingine duniani kote ni Kufr au nchi ya vita. Kwa hiyo Dola ya Kiislamu imezungukwa na maadui wakati wote, wakisubiri fursa ya kushambulia. Iwapo jeshi litapewa uwepo wowote katika utawala, hata nafasi yake iwe ndogo kiasi gani, kuchochewa kwake na maadui ni rahisi kuliko kuchochewa kwa wanasiasa, kwa kuwa asili ya kazi yao ni kazi ya kijeshi ya kimaada, hivyo ni vigumu kwao kuelewa mipango ya mbali na matokeo ya kisiasa yaliyofichika. Kwa hiyo wanaweza kuchochewa kunyakua utawala au kuwabadilisha watawala kwa kupata faida fulani kwa nchi kulingana na maoni yao, au faida binafsi kwao. Hapa kuna hatari, si kwa watu wanaotawala wala kwa utawala wenyewe, bali kwa taasisi ya Ummah na taasisi ya Dola, kwa sababu taasisi ya Ummah ni mkusanyiko wa watu pamoja na mkusanyiko wa dhana, vipimo na imani. Taasisi ya Dola ni mkusanyiko wa watu wenye mamlaka ya kutawala pamoja na mkusanyiko wa vipimo, dhana na imani. Iwapo jeshi litanyakua utawala kutokana na uchochezi wa kigeni, dhana, vipimo na imani zisizo zile za Dola zitaingia ndani yao, yaani ndani ya jeshi. Kasoro zitaingia katika taasisi ya Dola; hata ushawishi wa nchi za Kikafiri unaweza kuingia, jambo litakalosababisha mtawanyiko na kudhoofika. Kwa hiyo, kuvumilia uwepo wowote wa kijeshi au wa wanajeshi katika mamlaka, yaani utawala, ni hatari ya kuchukiza.

As for the danger of the presence of any role for soldiers in the rule to the Ummah’s entity and the State’s entity, the Islamic State due to the nature of the thought it carries is surrounded by enemies. The Shari’ah rule which the State and the Ummah must adhere to is that the whole world is either an Islamic homeland or a war homeland. The lands which rule by Islam and the Islamic flag shades them are the Islamic homeland; everything else throughout the world is Kufr or war homeland. Therefore the Islamic State is surrounded by enemies at all times waiting for the opportunity to attack. If soldiers are given any presence in the rule, however small their role, their incitement by the enemies is easier than the incitement of politicians since the nature of their work is material military work so it is difficult for them to understand remote manoeuvres and hidden political ramifications. Therefore they can be incited to seize the rule or change the rulers in exchange for some gains for the country according to their opinion or personal gains for them. Herein exists danger not to the ruling personalities nor upon the rule itself but upon the Ummah’s entity and the State’s entity because the Ummah’s entity is the collection of people together with the collection of concepts, measurements and convictions. The State’s entity is the collection of people with the authority to rule with the collection of measurements, concepts and convictions. If the soldiers seize the rule due to foreign incitement, there would infiltrate into them, i.e. the soldiers, concepts, measurements and convictions other than those in the State. Therein defects will enter into the State’s entity; there could even enter the influence of Kafir states which will result in dissipation and decline. Accordingly, tolerance for any presence for the military presence or soldiers in the authority i.e. rule is an abominable danger.

Ummah ya Kiislamu iliteseka kutokana na hatari ya uwepo wa wanajeshi wenye mamlaka, kupitia yale yaliyoipata ya kupenyezwa kwa kasoro ndani ya muundo wa Dola na Ummah, kisha uharibifu wa muundo wa Dola ya Kiislamu na muundo wa Ummah ya Kiislamu kutoka duniani. Katika kipindi cha mwisho cha Waothmani, balozi za nchi za kikafiri mjini Istanbul ziliwashawishi wanajeshi hadi dhana, vipimo na imani zisizo za Kiislamu zikaingia katika vyombo vya Dola. Nafasi ya Madhat Pasha na maafisa waliokuwa pamoja naye katika kuunda dhana, vipimo na imani hizi ni miongoni mwa nafasi zilizo maarufu zaidi, hasa mapinduzi yaliyomfanya Abdulhamid kuwa Khalifa na mapinduzi yaliyomwondoa Abdulhamid katika Ukhalifa na kumleta Muhammad Rashad kuwa Khalifa. Kabla ya hayo, nafasi ya Muhammad Ali huko Misri ilikuwa kubwa katika kujifanya wakala wa Kifaransa katika kuushambulia Ukhalifa wa Kiislamu mjini Istanbul. Kisha nafasi ya Mustapha Kamal, baada ya kushindwa kwa Dola ya Kiothmani katika Vita vya Kwanza vya Dunia, ya kula njama na Waingereza katika kuuangamiza Ukhalifa kwa malipo ya kuwaondoa Makhalifa kutoka Istanbul na kumsaidia katika mkutano wa amani. Nafasi hizi zilizochukuliwa na wanajeshi ziliitikisa Dola ya Kiislamu na kisha kuiondoa, kisha zikaondoa muundo wa Ummah ya Kiislamu kutoka duniani. Kwa hiyo hairuhusiwi kuwaruhusu jeshi au wanajeshi kuwa na uwepo wowote katika mamlaka.

The Islamic Ummah Suffered from the danger of the presence of a role soldiers in authority via what befell it of the infiltration of defects into the entity of the State and Ummah, and then the destruction of the entity of the Islamic State and the entity of the Islamic Ummah from existence. In the last period of the Ottomans, the embassies of the Kafir states in Istanbul influenced the soldiers until there entered in the State apparatus unIslamic concepts, measurements and convictions. The role of Madhat Pasha and the officers together with him in creating these concepts, measurements and convictions is of the most prominent roles, particularly the coup that brought Abdulhamid to be the Khalifah and the coup that removed Abdulhamid from the Khilafah and brought Muhammad Rashad as Khalifah. Before that, the role of Muhammad Ali in Egypt was great in making himself a French agent in striking the Islamic Khilafah in Istanbul. Then the role of Mustapha Kamal, following the defeat of the Ottoman State in World War One, in conspiring with the English in destroying the Khilafah in exchange for removing the Khulafaa from Istanbul and helping him in the peace conference. These roles undertaken by soldiers shook the entity of the Islamic State and then removed it, and then removed the entity of the Islamic Ummah from existence. Therefore it is not allowed to permit the military apparatus or soldiers any presence in authority.