Haijuzu kutoa hukmu juu ya vitu na vitendo isipokuwa kuna dalili ya kishari'a kwa hukmu hiyo, kwa kuwa hakuna hukmu kwa vitu na kwa vitendo vya watu wenye akili kabla ya kuja kwa sharia'; Mwenye Enzi Kuu amesema,

It is not permissible that a hukm be given upon things and actions except if there is a shar’i evidence for that hukm, because there is no hukm for things and for actions of the sane, before the coming of the shar’; the Exalted says,

(al-Nisā’: 165); na kwa sababu hukm haithibitishwi isipokuwa kwa mojawapo ya mambo mawili: shar’ au akili. Kuhusu akili, haina nafasi hapa kwa sababu jambo hili ni la wajibu na katazo, na haifai kwa akili kuwajibisha au kukataza, kwa kuwa hilo si eneo lake. Bali hili ni eneo la shar’, hivyo hukm inategemea shar’. Kwa kuwa hakuna shar’ kabla ya kuja kwa shar’, basi hukm inategemea kuja kwa shar’ kutoka kwa Allah, yaani kuja kwa mjumbe kuhusiana na shari’ah nzima, na dalili ya kishari’ kuhusiana na suala fulani linalotafutiwa dalili. Kuhusu (kuja kwa) mjumbe, hili linadhihirika kwa maana ya wazi [sarīh] ya āyah hii, kwa sababu kukanushwa kwa adhabu kwa watu kabla ya kuja kwa mjumbe kunaonyesha kwamba hawana taklīf ya kanuni wala imani yoyote, yaani hawana wajibu wa jambo lolote. Hii haimaanishi chochote zaidi ya kukanushwa kabisa kwa hukm kwa watu kabla Allah hajawainulia mjumbe. Hivyo ahl al-fatrah – wale walioishi kati ya kupotea kwa ujumbe na kuja kwa ujumbe, kama wale walioishi kabla ya kuja kwa Muhammad ﷺ (baada ya kuharibiwa kwa ujumbe wa Isa (as)) – wameokolewa na adhabu, na hukumu yao ni hukumu ya wale ambao ujumbe haujawafikia. Vilevile, wale ambao ujumbe wa Muhammad ﷺ haujawafikia katika umbo lake sahihi, wameokolewa na adhabu kama ahl al-fatrah, kwa sababu āyah inawahusu nao wanachukuliwa kana kwamba hakuna mjumbe aliyetumwa kwao, kwa sababu ujumbe haukuwafikia, na dhambi ya ujumbe kutowafikia iko juu ya wale waliokuwa na uwezo wa kuwafikishia lakini hawakufanya hivyo. Kwa hiyo, kabla ya kuja kwa Mjumbe ﷺ hakusemwi kwamba hukm ya mambo ni halali au haramu, kwa sababu hayakuwa na hukm; vivyo hivyo kwa vitendo. Bali, hadi Mwenyezi Mungu atakapotuma mjumbe, mwanadamu yuko huru kutenda apendavyo, bila kuwa chini ya hukmu yoyote, wala hakuna chochote juu yake kutoka kwa Allah. Mjumbe anapotumwa, basi mwanadamu anawajibika kwa hukmu za Allah ambazo mjumbe anamfikishia, kama zilivyofikishwa kwake (mjumbe) kutoka kwa Allah.

(al-Nisā’: 165); and because the hukm is not established except by one of two: the shar’ or the intellect. As for the intellect, it has no place here because the matter is one of obligation and prohibition, and it is not permissible for the intellect to obligate or prohibit, for this is not its realm. Rather this is the realm of the shar’, thus the hukm depends on the shar’. Because there is no shar’ before the coming of the shar’, the hukm thus depends on the coming of the shar’ from Allah, that is, on the coming of a messenger with regards to a whole shari’ah, and the shar’i evidence with regards to a given issue for which evidence is sought. With respect to (the coming of) a messenger, then this is clear from the explicit meaning [sarīh] of the āyah, because the negation of punishment on the people prior to the advent of a messenger indicates upon their not having responsibility [taklīf] for any rules or beliefs, that is, their not having responsibility for anything. This means naught but a complete negation of the hukm for the people prior to Allah raising for them a messenger. Thus the ahl al-fatrah – those who lived between the loss of a message and the advent of a message, like those who lived before the advent of Muhammad (saw) (and after the corruption of the message of Isa (as)) – are saved from punishment and their judgment is the judgment of those to whom the message does not reach. Similarly those to whom the message of Muhammad (saw) does not reach in its correct form, are saved from punishment like the ahl al fatrah, because the āyah applies to them and they are considered as if no messenger was sent to them, because the message did not reach them and the sin of it not reaching them is upon those who were able to take it to them but did not. Therefore, prior to the advent of the Messenger it is not said that the hukm of things is halāl or harām, because they had no hukm; the same with the actions. Rather, until Allah does not send a messenger, man is free to act as he wishes, without being under any hukm, and nothing is upon him from Allah. When a messenger is sent then man is obliged by the ahkām of Allah which the messenger communicates to him, as communicated to him (the messenger) from Allah

Baada ya kuja kwa mjumbe na kufikisha ujumbe wake, jambo hilo huangaliwa: ikiwa ujumbe ulikuja na mambo mahususi na kuamuru kufuatwa kwa ujumbe mwingine (wa mjumbe mwingine) kwa mambo mengine, kama ilivyo kwa bwana wetu ʿĪsā (as), basi hadi ujumbe huo utakapofutwa, watu wanawajibika kwa aḥkām zilizowafikia na wanalazimika kuzifuata, na watapewa adhabu kwa kutoishi kwa mujibu wake. Ikiwa ujumbe wa mjumbe ulikuja na baadhi ya mambo na si mengine, basi watu wanalazimika tu kwa yale yaliyokuja, na hawaadhibiwi kwa yale ambayo hayakuja. Kwa upande mwingine, ikiwa ujumbe unajumuisha mambo yote na umekuja ukieleza mambo yote, basi watu wanalazimika kwa kila kitu kilichomo katika ujumbe huo, kama ilivyo kwa bwana wetu Muhammad ﷺ; ujumbe wake unajumuisha mambo yote na umekuja ukieleza mambo yote; kwa hiyo hakuna hukmu isipokuwa ile iliyokuja ndani yake. Hii ni kwa sababu ya mafhūm [maana iliyodokezwa] ya kauli Yake

After the advent of a messenger and his deliverance of his message, the matter is considered: if the message came with specific things and commanded the following of a different message (of another messenger) for other things, as in the case with our master ‘Isā (as) then until this message is abrogated the people are responsible for the ahkām communicated to them and are obligated to follow them and will be punished for not living by them. If the message of the messenger came with some things and not others, then the people are obligated only by what came and are not punished for what did not come. On the other hand, if the message covers all things and came explaining all things, then the people are obligated with everything in this message, as is the case with our master Muhammad (saw); his message covers all things and came explaining all things; therefore there is no hukm except what came in it. This is because the mafhūm [implied meaning] of His saying

Haipaswi kusemwa basi kwamba hali ya asili [al-'asl] ya mambo na vitendo ni katazo [tahrim], kwa hoja kwamba ni utumiaji huru [tasarruf] katika utawala wa Allah Mtukufu bila ruhusa yake, hivyo ni haramu, kwa kulinganisha na viumbe, kwa sababu maana wazi ya aya ni kwamba Allah haadhibu hadi amtume mtume, kwa hiyo hahesabu hadi abainishe hukm. Zaidi ya hayo, viumbe wanaweza kudhurika, lakini Allah Mtukufu yuko juu ya kufaidika au kudhurika.

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

Vivyo hivyo, haipasi kusemwa kwamba msingi [‘asl] wa vitendo na vitu ni ruhusa, kwa hoja kwamba matumizi yake ni huru kutokana na dalili yoyote ya uharibifu au madhara kwa mmiliki, na hivyo ni halali. Haipasi kusemwa hivi kwa sababu maana ya kufahamika kwa kukinzana [mafhūm] ya āyah ni kwamba mtu amewajibishwa kwa kile ambacho Mtume amekuja nacho; anaadhibiwa kwa kukiuka hilo; hivyo msingi unakuwa ni kufuata [ittibā’] Mtume na kufungwa na hukmu [ahkām] za ujumbe wake; msingi si ruhusa, ambayo ni kutokuwepo kwa kufungwa. Kwa kuwa ujumla wa āyāt za ahkām unaonyesha umuhimu wa kurejea kwenye Shari‘ah na umuhimu wa kufungwa na hukmu zake; Mwenye Enzi Kuu anasema:

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

Haipaswi kusemwa basi kwamba hali ya asili [al-'asl] ya mambo na vitendo ni katazo [tahrim], kwa hoja kwamba ni utumiaji huru [tasarruf] katika utawala wa Allah Mtukufu bila ruhusa yake, hivyo ni haramu, kwa kulinganisha na viumbe, kwa sababu maana wazi ya aya ni kwamba Allah haadhibu hadi amtume mtume, kwa hiyo hahesabu hadi abainishe hukm. Zaidi ya hayo, viumbe wanaweza kudhurika, lakini Allah Mtukufu yuko juu ya kufaidika au kudhurika.

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

Vivyo hivyo, haipasi kusemwa kwamba msingi [‘asl] wa vitendo na vitu ni ruhusa, kwa hoja kwamba matumizi yake ni huru kutokana na dalili yoyote ya uharibifu au madhara kwa mmiliki, na hivyo ni halali. Haipasi kusemwa hivi kwa sababu maana ya kufahamika kwa kukinzana [mafhūm] ya āyah ni kwamba mtu amewajibishwa kwa kile ambacho Mtume amekuja nacho; anaadhibiwa kwa kukiuka hilo; hivyo msingi unakuwa ni kufuata [ittibā’] Mtume na kufungwa na hukmu [ahkām] za ujumbe wake; msingi si ruhusa, ambayo ni kutokuwepo kwa kufungwa. Kwa kuwa ujumla wa āyāt za ahkām unaonyesha umuhimu wa kurejea kwenye Shari‘ah na umuhimu wa kufungwa na hukmu zake; Mwenye Enzi Kuu anasema:

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

na

and

Matumizi yasiyo na dalili yoyote ya uharibifu wala ya kumdhuru mmiliki hayawi ushahidi wa kuruhusiwa. Si wazi kwamba kuzini na mwanamke ambaye hajaolewa na asiye na jamaa ni matumizi yasiyo na dalili yoyote ya uharibifu wala ya kumdhuru mmiliki, lakini bado ni haramu. Vivyo hivyo, kusema uongo kwa utani ili kumfanya mtu acheke hakuna dalili yoyote ya uharibifu wala madhara kwa mwenye kusema uongo na kwa mwenye kudanganywa, lakini bado ni haramu. Kwa hiyo vitu na vitendo vina hukmu baada ya kuja kwa Shari‘ah; hivyo msingi ni kutafuta katika Shari‘ah kuhusu vitu na vitendo: je, hukmu imekuja kwavyo au la? Msingi si kuruhusiwa kwa dhana, wala haipasi kutoa hukmu ya kuruhusiwa kwa akili moja kwa moja pale ambapo Shari‘ah ipo.

Further utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or bringing harm to the owner is not a proof for permissibility. It is not evident that adultery with an unmarried female who has no relatives constitutes utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner, yet it is prohibited. Similarly lying in jest to make someone laugh is free from any indication of corruption or harm with regards to both the one who lies and the one who is lied to, yet it is prohibited. Therefore the things and actions have a hukm after the coming of the shar’; so the ‘asl is to search in the Shari’ah for the things and actions: has a hukm come for them or not? The ‘asl is not permissibility by assumption nor should the hukm of permissibility by given by the intellect straight away in the presence of the shar’.

Vivyo hivyo pia inapaswa kusemwa kwamba msingi wa mambo ni kusitisha [tawaqquf] na kutokuwepo kwa hukmu. Kwa kuwa kusitisha kunamaanisha kwamba kitendo kimesimamishwa au hukmu imesimamishwa, na hili haliruhusiwi, kwa sababu kanuni iliyothibitishwa katika Qur'ani na Hadithi kwa mtu asiye na ujuzi ni kuuliza kuhusu hukmu, na si kuhusu kusitisha na kutokuwepo kwa hukmu. Aliyetukuka amesema:

Similarly it should be said that the ‘asl of things is cessation [tawaqquf] and the absence of the hukm. Since cessation means the action is suspended or the hukm is suspended and this is impermissible, because the established (rule) in the Qur’an and Hadith for the lack of knowledge is inquiring about the hukm and not the cessation and absence of the hukm. The Exalted says

Kwa hiyo, ni baada ya kuja kwa Mtume ndipo hukm inakuwa kwa ajili ya shar’, na hakuna hukm kabla ya kuja kwa shar’. Hivyo hukm inategemea kuja kwa shar’, yaani kuwepo kwa dalili ya shar’i kwa suala moja. Kwa hivyo hakuna hukm inayoweza kutolewa isipokuwa kwa msingi wa dalili, kama vile ambavyo hakuna hukm inayoweza kutolewa isipokuwa baada ya kuja kwa shar’. Msingi (asl) basi ni kutafuta hukm katika shar’, yaani msingi ni kutafuta dalili ya shar’i kwa hukm ya shar’i kutoka katika shar’.

Therefore it is after the advent of a Messenger that it that the hukm becomes for the shar’ and there is no hukm prior to the coming of the shar’, so the hukm depends on the coming of the shar’, that is, on the presence of a shar’i evidence for a single issue. Thus no hukm can be given except on the basis of an evidence, just as no hukm can be given except after the coming of the shar’. The ‘asl, then, is to search for the hukm in the shar’, that is, the ‘asl is to search for the shar’i evidence for a shar’i hukm from the shar’.

Suala moja bado linabaki: je, Shari'ah ya Kiislamu inajumuisha hukumu za mambo yote yaliyopita, matatizo yote ya sasa, pamoja na yale mambo yatakayotokea siku zijazo? Jibu la hili ni kwamba hakuna tukio linalotokea, suala linalojitokeza, wala tukio linalofanyika ambalo halina hukmu. Shari'ah ya Kiislamu imejumuisha kikamilifu matendo yote ya binadamu. Hakuna kilichotokea zamani, wala kilichopo sasa, wala jambo lolote linalowezekana kutokea baadaye, isipokuwa vyote hivi vina hukmu katika Shari'ah. Allah Mtukufu anasema:

One issue remains: does the Islamic Shari’ah encompass the rulings of all matters that have passed, all the present problems, as well as all those matters that may occur in the future? The answer to this is that there is no event which occurs, issue which arises, or incident which takes place but that it has a hukm. The Islamic Shari’ah has encompassed all the actions of man entirely. Nothing occurred in the past, nor is there anything in the present or possible thing occurring in the future except that all these have a hukm in the Shari’ah. Allah the Exalted says:

Hata kama kuna hadithi za upweke (āḥād), ambazo usimulizi wake kutoka kwa Mtume (ﷺ) umethibitishwa, zinazobeba maana hii, yaani kwamba kuna baadhi ya vitendo vya waja ambavyo Shari'ah haijatoa hukmu kwavyo, maana (dirayah) ya hadithi kama hizo inatupiliwa mbali kwa sababu ya kupingana kwake na aya ya Qur'an iliyo qat'i (yenye uhakika) katika usimulizi (thubūt) na maana (dalālah), kwa kuwa aya mbili zilizotajwa hapo juu ni qat'i katika usimulizi na maana, hivyo riwaya yoyote ya upweke inayopingana nazo, maana yake inatupiliwa mbali. Je, basi, si halali kwa Muislamu, kutoka pembe yoyote ile, baada ya kuelewa aya hizi mbili zilizo qat'i, kusema kwamba yupo hata uhalisia mmoja miongoni mwa vitendo vya binadamu ambao shar' haijaweka wazi hukmu yake?

Even if there are solitary ahadith, whose narration from the Messenger (saw) is authenticated, which carry this meaning, namely, that there exists some actions of the servants for which the Shari’ah has not given a hukm; the meaning [dirayah] of such ahadith is discarded because of its contradiction to a text of the Qur’an which is definitive [qat’i] in transmission [thubūt] and meaning [dalalah], because the two above-mentioned āyāt are definitive in transmission and meaning, so any solitary report which contradicts them, its meaning is discarded. Therefore is it not permissible, from any perspective, for a Muslim after understanding these two definitive āyāt to say that there exists even one reality from the actions of man that the shar’ has not clarified for it a hukm.

Kuhusu yale yaliyopokewa na Ibn Majah na Tirmidhi kutoka kwa Salman al-Farisi kwamba alisema: “Mtume wa Allah ﷺ aliulizwa kuhusu samli, jibini na manyoya, akasema: ‘Halali ni kile Allah alichokifanya halali katika Kitabu chake, na haramu ni kile Allah alichokifanya haramu katika Kitabu chake, na kile alichonyamazia, ni ruhusa kwenu [‘afa lakum]’”. Na yale aliyopokea al-Bazzar kutoka kwa Abu Darda’ kutoka kwa Nabii ﷺ kwamba alisema: “Kile Allah alichokifanya halali katika Kitabu chake ni halali, na kile alichokifanya haramu ni haramu, na kile alichonyamazia ni ruhusa; basi kubali ruhusa ya Allah kutoka kwake, kwani Allah hasahau chochote” – kisha akasoma: “Na Mola wako si msahaulifu” (Maryam: 64). Na yale aliyopokea al-Baihaqi kwa mnyororo wa Tha’labah kutoka kwa Nabii ﷺ kwamba alisema: “Allah amewalazimisha wajibu, basi msiyapuuze; na ameweka mipaka [hudūd], basi msiivuke; na amenyamazia mambo kwa rehema kwenu, si kwa kusahau, basi msiulize kuhusu hayo”; basi kwa upande mmoja, hadithi hizi ni habari za pekee (āḥād), kwa hiyo haziwezi kupingana na maandiko ya uhakika. Kwa upande mwingine, hadithi hizi hazionyeshi kuwepo kwa mambo ambayo Sharia haijayafafanua; zinaonyesha tu kuwepo kwa mambo ambayo Allah hakuyakataza kwa rehema kwenu, na amenyamazia katazo lake. Kwa hiyo, mada ya hadithi hizi si kunyamaza kuhusu kutungwa kwa hukumu za mambo hayo; bali ni kunyamaza kuhusu katazo lake. Maana ya "kunyamaza kuhusu (katazo lao)" si kwamba ni kuweka sheria ya kuruhusiwa [ibaha] kwa kila kitu ambacho hakijafafanuliwa; bali kunyamaza huku ni kunyamaza kwa Mwenye kuweka sheria kuhusu katazo, na kunyamaza Kwake kuhusu katazo ni (kuweka sheria ya) kuhalalishwa [halal], ambapo ndani yake yanajumuishwa yaliyo wajib, mandub, mubah, na makruh; na hili linahusu tu kile ambacho amekinyamazia, si kila kitu ambacho hakijafafanuliwa.

Maana ya hadithi za msamaha [afwu] ni sawa na kauli Yake,

The meaning of the ahadith of concession [afwu] is similar to His saying,

Al-Tabari anasimulia katika tafsir yake kutoka kwa Ubayd ibn Umayr, "Allah Mtukufu amehalalisha na kuharamisha (mambo na vitendo), basi chochote alichokihalalisha kichukulie kuwa halali, na chochote alichokiharamisha kijiepushe nacho, na amebakiza katika hayo baadhi ya mambo ambayo hakuyahalalisha wala kuyaharamisha waziwazi; hiyo ni ruhusa (afwu) kutoka kwa Allah ambayo ameitoa." Mtume ﷺ alichukia kuuliza maswali mengi kuhusu jambo ambalo hukmu yake haikuteremshwa, kwa msingi wa ruhusa ya asili [al-bara'ah al-asliyya], kwani hilo linarudi kwenye maana hiyo. Maana yake ni kwamba vitendo vinavyohusika vimeruhusiwa. Na yeye ﷺ alisema, "Muislamu mbaya kabisa miongoni mwa Waislamu ni yule anayeuliza kuhusu jambo ambalo si haramu kwao, kisha likawa haramu kwao kwa sababu ya swali lake," amepokea Muslim; na alisema, "Niacheni na nilichowaachia. Hakika walioangamia kabla yenu waliangamia kwa sababu tu ya kuuliza sana na kutofautiana kwao na manabii wao; nilichowakataza, jiepusheni nacho, na nilichowaamrisha, fanyeni kiasi cha uwezo wenu," amesimulia Ahmad. Zaidi ya hayo, Muslim na Ahmad wamesimulia kutoka kwa Abu Hurayra kwamba alisema, "Mtume wa Allah ﷺ alituhutubia akisema: 'Enyi watu, Allah amewawajibishia Hija, basi fanyeni Hija.' Mtu mmoja akauliza, 'Kila mwaka, ee Mtume wa Allah?' Yeye (Mtume) akanyamaza hadi yule mtu alipouliza mara tatu. Ndipo Mtume wa Allah ﷺ akajibu, 'Kama ningesema ndiyo, ingekuwa wajibu, nanyi msingeweza (kuitekeleza).' Kisha akasema, 'Niacheni na nilichowaachia.'" Kwa hiyo yote haya yanaonyesha kwamba maana ya kauli yake, "na alinyamaza kuhusu mambo," ni kwamba hakuyakataza, na ni sawa na kauli yake katika hadithi nyingine, "niacheni na nilichowaachia." Maana hii inaungwa mkono na riwaya nyingine ya hadithi hii hii, “na Yeye amekuruhusieni vitu”, yaani, aliviacha na hakuvikataza. Kwa hiyo maana ya kauli yake, “na Yeye alinyamaza kuhusu vitu”, au kauli yake, “na kile ambacho Yeye alinyamaza kuhusu hicho, kimeruhusiwa”, si kwamba hukmu ya baadhi ya vitendo vya waja haikufafanuliwa; bali maana yake ni kwamba baadhi ya vitu havijakatazwa kama rehema kwenu; na kile ambacho hakijakatazwa miongoni mwa vitu maalum kinaingia chini ya hukmu ya kunyamaza, hivyo hakikatazwi; hukmu yake ni kwamba ni halali. Basi jambo hili linahusiana na ukimya wa Ash-Shaari' kuhusu kukatazwa kwa vitu. Haliunganishwi na kutokuwepo kwa ufafanuzi wa hukmu za vitu.

Al-Tabari narrates in his tafsir from Ubayd ibn Umayr, “Allah the exalted has permitted and prohibited (things and actions), so whatever He has permitted take it as permitted, and whatever he has prohibited refrain from it, and He has left from that some things which He has not permitted or prohibited (expressly); that is a concession (afwu) from Allah which He has conceded.” The Prophet (saw) disliked excessive questioning regarding that about which no hukm had been revealed, on the basis of the original concession [al-bara’ah al-asliyya] since it returns to this meaning. Its meaning is that the related actions are conceded. And he (saw) said, “The worst of the Muslims amongst the Muslims is the one who asks about a thing which is not prohibited on them and consequently becomes prohibited upon them due to his questioning,” related by Muslim; and he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Verily those before you perished only on account of their excessive questioning and their disagreements with their prophets; what I have prohibited you from stay away from it, and what I have ordered you, do as much of it as you are able,” narrated by Ahmad. Further, Muslim and Ahmad related from Abu Hurayra that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) addressed us saying, ‘O people, Allah has obligated the pilgrimage on you, so make the pilgrimage’, so a man asked ‘Every year O Messenger of Allah?’ He (the Messenger) remained silent until the man asked three times, so the Messenger of Allah (saw) replied, “If I said yes, it would be obligated, and you would not be able (to fulfill it)’ then he said, ‘Leave me with what I have left you.’ So all of this indicates that the intent of his saying, “and He was silent on things” is that He did not prohibit them, and it is similar to his saying, in another hadith, “leave me with what I have left you”. This (meaning) is supported by another narration of this same hadith, “and He conceded you things”, that is, he left them and did not prohibit them. Therefore the meaning of his saying, “and He was silent on things” or his saying, “and that about which He was silent, is conceded” is not that the hukm of some actions of the servants has not been expounded, rather their meaning is that (some) things have not been prohibited as a mercy to you; and that which is not prohibited of specific things comes under the hukm of silence, so it is not prohibited; its hukm is that it is halal. Thus the matter is connected to the silence of the Legislator about the prohibition of things. It is not connected to the absence of the expounding the rulings of things.

Hivyo ndivyo ayah zote zinazoruhusu mambo zilivyokuja kwa namna ya jumla, na ujumla wake unaonyesha kuruhusiwa kwa mambo yote. Hivyo basi, ikiwa jambo fulani limekatazwa, lazima kuwepo na dalili ya wazi inayobainisha ujumla huo, inayoonyesha kwamba jambo hilo ni ubaguzi katika kuruhusiwa kwa mambo yote. Kutokana na hapa, msingi (asl) wa mambo ni kuruhusiwa.

Thus have all the ayāt which permit the things come in the general form, their generality indicating the permissibility of all things. Hence if a thing is prohibited there must exist a text specifying this generality, indicating that this thing is an exception to the permissibility of all things. From here, the ‘asl of things is permissibility.

Kwa hivyo, katika Wahyi tunakuta kwamba pale mambo yanapokatazwa, kuna matini mahsusi kuhusu mambo hayo hasa, kama ubaguzi kutoka kwenye matini za jumla; kwa mfano, Mwenye Nguvu Mtukufu anasema:

Accordingly we find in the revelation, when things are prohibited, specific texts about these things specifically as an exception to the general texts; so the Exalted says:

Haipaswi kusemwa kwamba kitu hakiwezi kutenganishwa na kitendo cha mja, hivyo hukmu yake hutokana na hukmu ya kitendo, na huchukua hukmu ya kitendo. Hili halipaswi kusemwa kwa sababu vitu, ingawa vinaunganishwa kwa lazima na vitendo, na ushahidi wake hutokana na ufafanuzi wa hukmu ya kitendo, ni tofauti na vitendo. Ushahidi wa kitendo cha mja, unapounganishwa na kitu, hufafanua kuhusu kitu hicho hukmu mbili pekee, ambazo ni ama ruhusa au katazo. Haisemwi kuhusu hukmu ya kitu kwamba ni wajibu au ni sunna. Hivyo, hukmu ya vitu imewekwa ndani ya ruhusa au katazo, na katika jambo hili kitu ni tofauti na kitendo cha mja, hivyo hakichukui tu hukmu ya kitendo, ijapokuwa hukmu yake inakuja katika kufafanua hukmu ya kitendo.

It should not be said that the thing is inseparable from the action of the servant, so its hukm comes from the hukm of the action, and it takes the hukm of the action. This should not be said because the things, notwithstanding that they are necessarily connected to the actions and that their evidence comes from the exposition of the hukm of the action, are different from the actions. The evidence of the action of the servant, when connected to a thing clarifies with respect to the thing two rulings alone, either permissibility or prohibition. It is not said about the hukm of a thing that it is obligatory or recommended. Thus the ruling of the things is confined to permissibility or prohibition, and in this respect the thing is different to the action of the servant, so it does not just take the hukm of the action, even if its hukm comes in the clarification of the hukm of the action.

Kutoka mtazamo mwingine, ujumla wa dalili za ruhusa, pamoja na kubainishwa kwa jambo mahususi katika dalili za katazo, hufanya ruhusa iwe ya jumla kwa mambo yote, na katazo liwe mahususi kwa yale tu yaliyokatazwa waziwazi. Hili pia hufanya hukmu ya kitu itofautiane, kwa kuzingatia hukmu ya asili na hukmu ambayo kitu kinaelezwa nayo, kuelekea hukmu ya tendo. Hukmu ya asili ya mambo ni ruhusa mradi hakuna dalili ya katazo, na hukmu ya asili ya matendo ni kufungwa na hukmu ya kisheria. Zaidi ya hayo, mambo hayaelezwi isipokuwa kwa ruhusa au katazo, tofauti na matendo, ambayo kwayo khitabu cha Mwekaji Sheria kina aina mbili: takleef na wad'. Aina ya kwanza ina aina tano: wajibu, mapendekezo, haramu, makaripio na ruhusa. Aina ya pili nayo ina aina tano: sababu, sharti, kizuizi, sahihi, batili na batili kabisa, pamoja na hukmu ya asili na ruhusa ya kipekee. Jumla ya mjadala huu ni kwamba si halali, baada ya kuja kwa Bwana wetu Muhammad ﷺ kwa wanadamu wote, kusema kwamba kuna tendo au kitu kisicho na hukmu. Wala hakuna hukmu ya kitu au tendo bila dalili kutoka kwenye wahyi, kwa kuwa hukmu ni khitabu cha Mwekaji Sheria. Wala si halali kusema kwamba kila kile ambacho wahyi haujabainisha hukmu yake ni ruhusa, kwa sababu ruhusa yenyewe ni hukmu ya kisheria, kwani ni khitabu cha Mwekaji Sheria cha kutoa hiari inayohusiana na matendo ya waja. Dai kwamba kuna mambo ambayo hukmu yake haikubainishwa na Mwekaji Sheria linamaanisha kwamba kuna mambo ambayo Qur'ani haikuyabainisha, na kwamba Shari'ah ina upungufu. Hili si sahihi, kwa kuwa linapingana na maandiko yenye uhakika, kwa upande wa upokezi na maana, ya Qur'ani.