Isipokuwa suala la hukumu kuhusu mtendaji wa kabīrah (dhambi kubwa), ambalo kwalo Wāṣil Ibn ‘Atā’, kiongozi wa Mu‘tazilah, alijitenga na halaqa ya al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, ni vigumu kupata suala lolote miongoni mwa masuala ya ‘Ilm al-Kalām ambalo halikutokana na suala lililojadiliwa na wanafalsafa wa Kigiriki. Suala la al-qaḍā’ wa‘l-qadar kwa jina hili na kwa maana ambayo walilijadili lilijadiliwa na wanafalsafa wa Kigiriki, nao walitofautiana juu yake. Suala hili hutajwa kama suala la al-qaḍā’ wa‘l-qadar, na kama al-jabr wa‘l-ikhtiyār, na kama ḥurriyat al-irādah, yote yakiwa na maana moja, nayo ni: Vitendo ambavyo mwanadamu hufanya, je, yuko huru kuvifanya au hayuko huru, au analazimishwa? Haikuwahi kujitokeza akilini mwa Waislamu - kabla ya tafsiri ya falsafa ya Kigiriki - kuchunguza somo hili. Ni wanafalsafa wa Kigiriki waliolichunguza na kutofautiana juu yake. Waepikuro walisema kwamba utashi ni huru katika kuchagua, na kwamba mwanadamu hufanya vitendo vyake vyote kwa mapenzi yake na uchaguzi wake, bila shinikizo lolote. Kwa upande wa Wastoiki, walisema kwamba utashi unalazimishwa kuchukua njia inayochukua, hauwezi kuiacha. Kwa mujibu wao, mwanadamu hafanyi chochote kwa mapenzi yake; analazimishwa kufanya lolote analofanya, wala hana uwezo wa kuchagua kuanzisha kitendo au kutokifanya. Baada ya kuja kwa Uislamu na kuingia kwa mawazo ya kifalsafa, mojawapo ya masuala makuu lilikuwa sifa ya ‘adl (haki) kuhusu Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni Mwenye haki; kutokana na msingi wa haki hii hufuata suala la adhabu na thawabu, na kutokana nalo hujitokeza suala la mja kuwajibika kwa vitendo vyake, yote hayo yakachunguzwa, kwa kufuata mbinu ya uchunguzi waliyoitumia katika kuchunguza suala lolote na matawi yake yote, na kwa sababu ya ushawishi wa uchunguzi wa wanafalsafa. Walichokuwa wakisoma kuhusu mawazo ya kifalsafa yaliyohusiana na mada walizokuwa wakizikanusha. Maarufu zaidi kati ya hayo ni mjadala wa Mu‘tazilah, kwa kuwa ndio mjadala wa asili katika jambo hili; mijadala ya Mutakallimīn wengine inakuja tu kama jibu la kukanusha maoni ya Mu‘tazilah. Hivyo Mu‘tazilah wanachukuliwa kuwa waanzilishi katika kujadili suala la al-qadā’ wa ‘l-qadar, bali katika mada zote za ‘Ilm al-Kalam. Mtazamo wa Mu‘tazilah kuhusu uadilifu wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ulikuwa wa kumtakasa Yeye كما ذُكِرَ juu ya dhulma. Kuhusu suala la adhabu na thawabu, walichukua msimamo uliokubaliana na kutakasika kwa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na uadilifu Wake. Waliweka dhana kwamba uadilifu wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ hauna maana bila kuthibitisha uhuru wa matakwa ya mwanadamu na kuthibitisha kwamba yeye huumba vitendo vyake, na kwamba yeye ana uwezo wa kutenda au kujizuia kutenda. Hivyo, akitenda kwa hiari au akijizuia kwa hiari, adhabu au thawabu yake itakuwa inaeleweka na ya haki. Lakini Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ akimuumba mwanadamu na kumlazimisha kutenda kwa namna fulani, kwa kuwalazimisha watiifu kuelekea utiifu na waasi kuelekea uasi, kisha akamuadhibu na kumlipa, hilo lisingekuwa la haki hata kidogo. Hivyo walifananisha yasiyoonekana na yanayoonekana, wakimfananisha Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na mwanadamu. Waliitiisha sheria za dunia hii kwa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kama vile kundi la wanafalsafa wa Kigiriki walivyofanya. Hivyo waliwajibisha uadilifu kwa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kama ulivyofikiriwa na mwanadamu. Chanzo cha mjadala ni adhabu na thawabu kutoka kwa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kwa kitendo cha mja. Mada hii ya majadiliano ilipewa jina la ‘al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar’, au ‘al-jabr wa‘l-ikhtiyār’, au ‘hurriyat al-irādah’. Mbinu yao katika majadiliano hayo ilikuwa ile ya wanafalsafa wa Kigiriki: walijadili matakwa [irādah] na uumbaji wa vitendo. Kuhusu suala la matakwa, walisema: tunaona kwamba anayetaka jema ni mwema mwenyewe, na anayetaka ovu ni mwovu, anayetaka haki ni mwenye haki, na anayetaka dhulma ni mwenye dhulma. Basi, endapo Matakwa ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ yangehusishwa na kila jema na ovu duniani, basi jema na ovu vingekuwa vimetakwa na Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, na hivyo yule anayetaka angestahili sifa ya kuwa mwema na mwovu, mwenye haki na mwenye dhulma, na The Islamic Personality Vol.1 41

With the exception of the issue of ruler regarding the perpetrator of a kabīrah (major sin) over which Wāsil Ibn ‘Atā’, the head of the Mu’tazilah, withdrew from the circle of al-Hasan al-Basrī, we can hardly find any issue from the issues of ‘Ilm al-Kalam which had not originated from an issue that was discussed by the Greek philosophers. The issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar by this name and with the referent which they discussed had been discussed by Greek philosophers, and they had differed in it. This issue is referred to as the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar and as al-jabr wa‘l-khtiyār, and as hurriyat al-irādah, all of which have the same referent, namely: The actions that man does, is he free to do them or not, or is he compelled? It never occurred to the minds of the Muslims - before the translation of the Greek philosophy - to inquire into this subject matter. It was the Greek philosophers who inquired into it and differed in it. The Epicureans opined that the will is free in choice and that man does all of his actions according to his will and choice, without any compulsion. As for the Stoics, they opined that the will is compelled to take the path it takes, incapable of departing from it. Man, according to them, does nothing in accordance with his will; he is compelled to do whatever he does and does not have the ability to make a choice to undertake an action or not. After the advent of Islam and the infiltration of philosophical thoughts, one of the major issues was the attribute of justice with regards to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is just; from the proposition of this justice follows the issue of punishment and reward, from which arises the issue of the servant’s commission of his actions, all of which were inquired into, in line with the method of inquiry which they adopted in inquring into an issue as well as into all its offshoots, and due to the influence of the inquisitions of the philosophers i.e the philosophical thoughts they had studied in relation to the topics they were refuting. The most prominent of these was the discussion by the Mu’tazilah, being the original discussion in this matter; the discussions of the other Mutakallimīn come only as a response to refute the views of the Mu’tazilah. Thus the Mu’tazilah are considered the pioneers in discussing the issue of al-qadā’ wa ‘l-qadar, nay in all the topics of ‘Ilm al-Kalam. The Mu’tazilah’s view of the justice of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ was one of subliming Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ above injustice. Regarding the issue of punishment and reward, they took a stance which was consistent with the subliming of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and with his Justice. They postulated that the justice of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ would be meaningless without the affirmation of the freedom of the will of man and the affirmation that he creates his actions and that he is capable of doing or refraining from doing; thus if he does (an action) voluntarily or refrains from doing (it) voluntarily, his punishment or reward will be understandable and just. But if Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰcreates man and compels him to act in a certain way by compelling the obedient toward obedience and the disobedient toward disobedience and then punishes him and rewards him, this would not be just in the least. Thus they drew analogy between the unseen and the seen, comparing Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to man. They subjected the laws of this world to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ precisely as a group of the Greek philosophers had done. Thus they obligated justice upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ as it was envisaged by man. The origin of the discussion is the punishment and reward from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ for the servant’s action. This is the subject matter of the discussion which was given the name ‘al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar’ or as ‘al-jabr wa‘l-ikhtiyār’ or ‘hurriyat al-irādah’. Their approach to the discussion was that of the Greek philosophers: they discussed volition [irādah] and the creation of acts. Regarding the issue of volition, they said: we see that the one who wills good is himself good and the one who wills evil is evil, the one who wills justice is just and one who wills injustice is unjust. Thus if the Will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ were associated to all good and evil in the world, good and evil would be willed by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and thus the one who willed would merit the description of good and evil, just and unjust, and The Islamic Personality Vol.1 41

Jambo hili haliwezekani kuhusiana na Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Pia walisema kwamba kama Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ angetaka kufru ya kafiri na uasi wa mwasi, basi asingewakataza kufuru na uasi; na inawezekanaje kufikiriwa kwamba Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ alitaka Abu Lahab awe kafiri kisha akamwamuru awe na imani na akamkataza kufuru? Kama mmoja wa viumbe angefanya hivi, bila shaka angehesabiwa mjinga; Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ametukuka juu ya hayo. Zaidi ya hayo, kama kufuru ya kafiri na uasi wa mwasi vingetakwa na Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, basi wasingestahili adhabu; vitendo vyao vingekuwa utii kwa Mapenzi yake الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ… Hivyo wakaendelea kwa hoja za kimantiki, kisha wakafuatisha hili kwa ushahidi wa kimaandiko kutoka Qur'ani Tukufu, wakinukuu kauli ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

this is an impossibility with regard to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. They also said that if Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ had willed the kufr of the kāfir and the disobedience of the disobedient, he would not have prohibited them from kufr and disobedience, and how can it be thinkable that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ willed for Abu Lahab that he be a kāfir and then ordered him to have imān and prohibited him from kufr? If any one of the creation did this, he certainly would be (deemed) foolish; Exalted is Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ high above such. Further, if the kufr of a kāfir and the disobedience of the disobedient were willed by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, they would not be deserving the punishment; their acts actually would be in obedience to his الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ Will… Thus they proceeded with logical propositions, and then they followed this up with textual proofs from the Noble Quran, citing the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Na

And

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Walibadilisha aya zilizopingana na mtazamo wao, kwa mfano kauli ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

They manipulated the ayāt that contradicted their viewpoint, for example the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Walihitimisha kutoka hapa kwa maoni waliyoyashikilia na kuyaeneza, yaani mtazamo wao unaojulikana kwamba mwanadamu ana uhuru wa nia wa kufanya kitendo au kujizuia nacho. Hivyo akitenda, ni kwa mapenzi yake, na akijizuia, pia ni kwa mapenzi yake. Kuhusu suala la uumbaji wa vitendo, Mu'tazilah walisema kwamba vitendo vya waja vinaumbwa na wao wenyewe na ni vitendo vyao wenyewe, si vya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; ni katika uwezo wao kufanya vitendo hivi au kujizuia navyo bila kuingiliwa na nguvu ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Ushahidi wa hili ni tofauti ambayo mwanadamu huihisi kati ya mwendo wa hiari na wa lazima, kama mwendo wa mtu anayeinua mkono wake kwa hiari na mwendo wa mtu anayetetemeka, na kama tofauti kati ya mwendo wa mtu anayepanda juu ya mnara wa taa na mwingine anayeanguka kutoka humo. Kwa hiyo mwendo wa hiari uko katika uwezo wa mwanadamu: yeye ndiye anayeuumba; lakini hana nafasi yoyote katika mwendo wa lazima. Pia, kama mwanadamu asingekuwa muumbaji wa vitendo vyake, taklīf (wajibu wa kutekeleza Sharia) ingebatilika bila shaka, kwani kama asingeweza kutenda au kujizuia kutenda, isingekuwa busara kumwamuru atende au ajizuie kutenda, wala hilo lisingekuwa sababu ya sifa, lawama, thawabu wala adhabu. Hivyo, walifuata hoja ya msimamo wao huu kwa kutumia kanuni za kimantiki, kisha wakaongeza ushahidi wa kimaandiko, wakinukuu aya nyingi, kama kauli ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

They concluded from this the opinion that they held and advocated, namely their well-known view that man has the freedom of will to do an act or refrain from it. Thus if he acts, it is according to his will and if he refrains, it is also according to his will. As for the issue of the creation of acts, the Mu’tazilah said that the acts of the servants are created by them and are of their own doing not of Allah’sالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; it is in their power to do these acts or refrain from them without any intervention of the power of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The proof of this is the difference which man feels between the voluntary and the involuntary movement, such as the movement of a person who voluntarily moves his hand and the movement of a trembling person, and such as the difference between the movement of someone going up a lighthouse and another falling from it. Thus the voluntary movement is in the power of man: it is he who creates it; but he has no role in the involuntary movement. Also, if man was not the creator of his acts, the taklīf (obligation to comply with the Sharī’a) would certainly be invalidated, since if he was not capable of acting or refraining from acting, it would not be rational to ask him to act or to refrain from acting and this would not have been the subject of praise, reproach, reward or punishment. Thus, they proceeded with the proof of this opinion of theirs via logical propositions, and then they annexed to this textual proofs, citing many ayāt, like the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Waliyapotosha aya zilizopingana na maoni yao haya, kama kauli ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

They manipulated the ayāt which contradicted this opinion of theirs, like the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Walihitimisha kwa kauli waliyoishikilia kuhusu suala la uumbaji wa vitendo, yaani mtazamo kwamba binadamu huumba vitendo vyake mwenyewe na kwamba ana uwezo wa kutenda kitendo au kukiacha. Kufuatia mbinu ya uchunguzi ya Mutakallimīn katika kujadili suala hili pamoja na matawi yake, mojawapo ya matawi ya suala la uumbaji wa vitendo lilikuwa suala la sababu na athari. Baada ya Mu‘tazilah kuthibitisha kwamba vitendo vya binadamu huumbwa na yeye mwenyewe, swali likaibuka kutokana na hilo: vipi kuhusu vitu vinavyotokana na kitendo chake? Je, navyo pia huumbwa naye? Au huumbwa na Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ? Kwa mfano, maumivu anayohisi mtu aliyepigwa, ladha ambayo kitu hupata kama matokeo ya kitendo cha binadamu, mkato unaotokea kutokana na kisu, starehe, afya, tamaa, joto, baridi, unyevu, ugumu, woga, ujasiri, njaa, kushiba, n.k. Walisema kwamba vyote hivi ni sehemu ya kitendo cha binadamu kwa sababu ni yeye anayevisababisha anapotekeleza vitendo vyake. Hivyo ni matokeo yanayofuata kitendo chake, na kwa hiyo huumbwa naye.

They concluded with the opinion which they held regarding the issue of the creation of acts, namely the view that man creates his own actions by himself and that he is capable of doing an act or refraining from it. In pursuance of the methodology of inquiry of the Mutakallimīn in discussing the issue as well as its offshoots, one of the offshoots of the issue of the creation of acts was the issue of causality. After the Mu’tazilah had determined that the acts of man are created by him, a question arose from this: what about the acts that result from his action? Are they created by him as well? Or are they created by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ? For example, the pain felt by a person who has been hit, the taste that a thing comes to have as a result of the action of man, the cutting that occurs from a knife, pleasure, health, lust, heat, cold, humidity, solidity, cowardice, courage, hunger, satisfaction, etc. They said that all these are part of the action of man because it is man who causes them when he performs his acts. Thus they are ensuing from his act and as a result are created by him.

Hili ni suala la al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar na maoni ya Mu’tazilah kuhusu suala hilo. Kiini chake ni suala la utashi wa kitendo cha mja, pamoja na sifa zinazotokea katika vitu kama matokeo ya kitendo cha mwanadamu. Kiini cha maoni yao ni kwamba mja ana hiari katika vitendo vyake vyote, na kwamba yeye ndiye anayeviumba vitendo vyake pamoja na sifa zinazotokea katika vitu kama matokeo ya kitendo chake.

This is the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar and the view of the Mu’tazilah regarding it. The essence of it is that it is the issue of the volition of the act of the servant and the attributes that occur in things as a result of the action of man. The essence of their view is that the servant has free will in all of his actions and that it is he who creates his actions and the attributes that occur in things as a result of his action.

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Walitafsiri aya zinazoonyesha hiari ya mja na uumbaji wake wa vitendo, na kwa hiyo wakasema kwamba sifa za mambo zinazotokana na kitendo cha mja, kama vile raha, njaa, ushujaa, kukata na kuchoma n.k., zinatoka kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

They would interpret away the ayāt indicating the free will of the servant and his creation of acts. Accordingly, they said that the attributes of things that result from the action of the servant such as pleasure, hunger, courage, cutting and burning etc. are from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

Ahl ul-Sunnah wa‘l-Jama’ah (pia) walijitokeza na kujibu hoja za Mu’tazilah. Ahl ul-Sunnah walisema kwamba matendo ya waja wote yanatokana na Mapenzi na Matakwa ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Mapenzi (iradah) na matakwa (mashī'ah), walisema, yana maana moja, nayo ni sifa ya milele ya al-Hayy (Aliye Hai, yaani Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ), ambayo huamua kuchagua kutokea kwa mojawapo ya mambo mawili yanayowezekana kwa wakati mmoja mahsusi, ilhali uwezo ni sawa kuhusiana na yote. Matendo ya waja yako kwa hukmu yake [hukm] — Anapotaka jambo, Yeye husema ‘Kuwa!’ nalo likawa — na qadiyyah yake, yaani qadā' yake, ambayo ni dalili ya tendo pamoja na masharti. Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ anasema,

Ahl ul-Sunnah wa‘l-Jama’ah (also) emerged and addressed themselves to refute the Mu’tazilah. Ahl ul-Sunnah said that the acts of the servants are all by the Will and Volition of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Will and volition, they said, mean the same thing, namely, an eternal attribute of al-Hayy (the Alive, i.e. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ), which dictates the opting for the occurrence of one of two practicables at one specific time while the capability is uniform with regard to all. The acts of the servants are according to his ruling [hukm] - when He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ Wills something He says ‘Be!’ and it is – and His qadiyyah, that is, His qadā’, which is a denotation of the act plus conditions; Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

Maana ya qadā’ hapa ni kitu kinachoathiriwa na qadā’, si sifa miongoni mwa sifa za Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Kitendo cha mja kinakuwa kulingana na mpangilio [taqdīr] wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ: ni kubainisha kila kiumbe kilichoumbwa kwa maelezo yake mahsusi kuhusu wema, ubaya, manufaa, madhara, pamoja na wakati na mahali vinavyokizunguka, na adhabu au thawabu inayofuata. Lengo hapa ni kuthibitisha ujumla wa Matakwa na Uwezo wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, kwa sababu vitu vyote vimeumbwa na Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. (Hili linaonyesha Uwezo na Matakwa ya Allah, bila kulazimishwa wala kulazimishiwa.) Wamesema: Ikiwa itasemwa kwamba kulingana na mtazamo wenu, kafiri analazimishwa katika ukafiri wake na fasiki analazimishwa katika ufisadi wake, na hivyo wajibu wao wa kuwa na imani na kutii haupo, jibu letu ni kwamba Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ Alitaka kutoka kwao ukafiri na ufisadi kwa hiari yao wenyewe, hivyo hakuna kulazimishwa; hii ni kama vile الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ alivyojua kabla ukafiri wao wa hiari na ufisadi wao, hivyo wajibu wa lisilowezekana haupo.

The intent of qadā’ here being the subject affected by the qadā’ and not an attribute from amongst the attributes of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The act of the servant is according to the arrangement [taqdīr] of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ: the characterisation of every created entity with its own specification as regards goodness, badness, usefulness, harmfulness and the time and place that contain it, and the consequent punishment and reward. The intention here is to affirm the generality of the Will and Capability of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ because all (things) are created by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ (This dictates the Capability and the Will (of Allah) for no compulsion or imposition.) They said: if it is said that according to your view a kāfir is compelled in his kufr and a fāsiq is compelled in his fisq and thus their obligation to have imān and be obedient would not be valid, our reply is that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ wanted from them kufr and fisq according to their own volition, thus there is no compulsion; this is just as الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ foreknew their voluntary kufr and fisq, thus the incumbency of the impossible does not The Islamic Personality Vol.1 45

Kuhusu vitendo vya waja, walijibu dhidi ya Mu‘tazilah na Jabriyyah: waja wana vitendo vya hiari ambavyo kwa ajili yake hulipwa thawabu endapo ni utiifu, na huadhibiwa endapo ni uasi. Walieleza jinsi walivyoliita la hiari huku wakishikilia kwamba Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ndiye Muumbaji pekee na Mtendaji pekee wa vitendo; hivyo wakasema: Muumbaji wa kitendo cha mja ni Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Uwezo na mapenzi ya mja vina nafasi katika baadhi ya vitendo, kama vile harakati ya kupiga, lakini si katika vingine, kama vile harakati ya kutetemeka (isiyo ya hiari). Kuhusu fikra kwamba Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ndiye Muumba wa kila kitu na mja ni mpataji tu, walilifafanua hili na kusema: kuelekeza na mja uwezo wake na mapenzi yake kwenye kitendo ni kasb (upataji), na Allah kukiathiri kitendo baadaye ni uumbaji. Utekelezaji uleule uko chini ya uwezo wote wawili lakini katika mielekeo miwili tofauti. Kitendo kinatekelezwa na Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ katika mwelekeo wa kuathiri, na kutekelezwa na mja katika mwelekeo wa upataji. Kwa maneno mengine, Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kila mara amekiumba kitendo kwa kutegemea uwezo na mapenzi ya mja lakini si kwa njia ya uwezo na mapenzi ya mja; mchanganyiko huu ndio upataji. Walithibitisha mtazamo wao kwa aya zile zile ambazo Jabriyyah walizitumia kuthibitisha uumbaji wa Allah wa vitendo na udhibiti wake juu yake, na walithibitisha upataji wa mja kwa kauli ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

Walijiona kuwa wameukataa mtazamo wa Mu'tazilah na Jabriyyah. Kwa kweli mtazamo wao na wa Jabriyyah ni mmoja na uleule. Wazo lao la "kasb" (kupata/kuchuma) lilikuwa kushindwa kabisa. Halikubaliani na akili kwa kuwa hakuna dalili ya kiakili inayolithibitisha, wala halikubaliani na nasi kwa kuwa hakuna dalili ya kinasi miongoni mwa maandiko ya kishari'a. Ni jaribio lililoshindwa tu la kupatanisha mitazamo ya Mu'tazilah na Jabriyyah. Kwa muhtasari, suala la al-qadā' wa al-qadar lilikuwa suala kubwa miongoni mwa Mutakallimīn, na wote walielekeza uchunguzi wao kwenye kitendo cha mja na sifa zinazotokana nacho, yaani sifa ambazo mja huzipa vitu kutokana na matendo yake. Msingi wa uchunguzi wao ulikuwa kitendo cha mja na sifa anazozipa kutokana na tendo lake: je, Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَىٰ ndiye aliyeviumba vyote viwili (kitendo na sifa hizo), au ni mja? Na je, hili hutokea kwa mapenzi ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَىٰ au kwa mapenzi ya mja? Chanzo kilichopelekea uchunguzi huu ni kuchukuliwa kwa suala la 'al-qadā' wa al-qadar' au 'al-jabr wa al-ikhtiyār' au 'hurriyat al-irādah' kutoka falsafa ya Kigiriki na Mu'tazilah, na mjadala wao juu yake kutoka mtazamo waliouona kuwa unaoendana na sifa ya Uadilifu ambayo ni wajibu kwa Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Hili lilipelekea kuibuka kwa Jabriyyah na Ahl al-Sunnah kuzikanusha dhana za Mu'tazilah, nao wakafanya hivyo kwa misingi na kanuni zilezile. Wote walijadili suala hili kwa mtazamo wa sifa za Allah سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَىٰ, si kwa mtazamo wa mada peke yake. Walitumia Utashi wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na Uwezo Wake kwa kitendo cha mja na kwa sifa ambazo mja huzitengeneza katika vitu; mada yao ya uchunguzi ikawa: je, hivi vinatokana na uwezo na utashi wa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, au vinatokana na uwezo na utashi wa mja? 46 Jinsi Suala la al-Qadaa’ wa‘l-Qadar Lilivyoibuka Al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, kwa hiyo, ni vitendo vya mja na sifa za vitu ambazo mwanadamu huzitengeneza katika vitu kutokana na kitendo chake. Hivyo qadā’ ni vitendo vya waja, na qadar ni sifa za vitu. Ukweli kwamba qadā’ ni vitendo vya waja unadhihirika kutokana na mjadala wao na mgawanyiko wao kuhusu hilo, yaani kauli yao kwamba mja hutekeleza kitendo kupitia uwezo wake mwenyewe na utashi wake, na kauli ya wale waliowakanusha kwamba kitendo kinatekelezwa kwa uwezo na utashi wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, si kwa uwezo na utashi wa mja, na kauli ya wale waliokanusha makundi yote mawili kwamba kitendo cha mja kinatimizwa kupitia uumbaji wa kitendo hicho na Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ wakati wa uwezo na utashi wa mja kwa kitendo hicho, si kwa njia ya uwezo na utashi wa mja. Hii inaashiria kwamba maana ya qadā’ ni vitendo vya waja. Ukweli kwamba qadar ni sifa zinazotengenezwa na mja katika vitu unadhihirika kutokana na mjadala wao na mgawanyiko wao kuhusu hilo: walipojadili kinachotokana na vitendo vya mja, walijadili sifa ambazo yeye huzitengeneza; hivyo wakasema: tukiongeza wanga katika sukari na kupika vyote viwili, hupatikana pudding: je, ladha na rangi ya pudding ni uumbaji wetu, au ni uumbaji wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ? Je, kutoka kwa roho (rūh) wakati wa kuchinja, mwendo wa jiwe wakati wa kulisukuma, kuona kwetu tunapofungua macho yetu, kuvunjika kwa mguu wakati wa kuanguka, na afya yake wakati wa kupona, n.k.? Je, vyote hivi ni vya uumbaji wetu au ni vya uumbaji wa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ?