12-modda

12-modda - Xalifalik davlatining qoralama konstitutsiyasi | Quran Course

Uchinchidan, aniq bo‘lgan narsa shuki, insonning hayotdagi xulq-atvori uning hayot haqidagi tushunchalariga muvofiq ravishda kechadi. Hayot haqidagi qarash akidani asos qilgan bo‘lsa-da, u baribir ummatda mavjud bo‘lgan ko‘plab tushunchalar, mezonlar va e’tiqodlardan tarkib topgan. Bu tushuncha, mezon va e’tiqodlarda aks etgan fikrlarning hammasi ham akida masalalaridan emas. Ularning ba’zilari akida masalalaridan, boshqalari esa shariat hukmlaridan bo‘lib, hukmlar eng kam shubha bilan chiqarilganligi sababli, agar hukmlarning asli Vahiy orqali kelganligi aniq tasdiqlanmasa, unda islomiy bo‘lmagan ba’zi fikrlar ummat ichiga kirib qolishidan qo‘rqiladi. Sababi, bunday hukmlar Vahiy dastlab olib kelmagan asosdan chiqarilgan bo‘ladi. Agar bunday hukmlar keng tarqalib, uzoq vaqt qo‘llanilsa, ular ummatning hayot haqidagi qarashiga ta’sir qiladi va natijada uning xulq-atvoriga ta’sir ko‘rsatadi. Shu sababli, Davlat tomonidan qo‘llaniladigan hukmlar chiqarilgan dalillarning aynan Vahiy orqali kelgan dalillar ekanligini tasdiqlash zarurdir.

Thirdly, what is conclusive is that man’s behaviour in life proceeds according to his concepts about life. Although the viewpoint about life has the 'Aqeedah as its basis, it is nevertheless formed of a host of concepts, criteria and convictions which are existent in the Ummah. Not all of these thoughts, which are reflected in this host of concepts, criteria and convictions are part of the matters of 'Aqeedah. Rather, some of them are from the matters of 'Aqeedah and others are part of Shari’ah rules, and since rules are deduced with the least amount of doubt it is ,therefore, feared that if the origin of the rules has not been conclusively confirmed as being brought by way of Revelation, then some of the non-Islamic thoughts may creep into the Ummah due to the presence of Shari’ah rules deduced from a foundation which Revelation has not brought in the first instance. If it is widespread and used over a long period of time it will influence the viewpoint about life held by the Ummah and consequently affects its behaviour. Accordingly, it is imperative to confirm that the evidences, upon which rules to be implemented by the State are deduced, must be those evidences brought by Revelation.

Ikkinchi masala shundan iboratki, biz dinimizni o'sha sahobalardan oldik, chunki aynan ular bizga bizning ustozimiz Muhammad ﷺ ga nozil bo'lgan o'sha Qur'onni yetkazib berganlar. Shuning uchun, agar ularning kelishgan masalalaridan biriga xato kirib qolgan deb faraz qilsak, bu Qur'onga ham xato kirishi mumkin degani bo'ladi; ya'ni biz ulardan olgan dinga ham xato kirishi mumkin bo'ladi, bu esa shariat nuqtai nazaridan mumkin emas. Demak, sahobalarning xato bir narsada umumiy ittifoq qilishi aql jihatidan mumkin bo'lmasa-da (chunki ular ham odam bo'lganlari uchun bu sodir bo'lishi mumkin edi), shariat nuqtai nazaridan bu ular uchun mumkin emas, chunki agar bu mumkin bo'lsa, dinga xato kirishi mumkin bo'lib qolardi. Boshqacha aytganda, bugun bizda bor bo'lgan bu Qur'on ustozimiz Muhammad ﷺ ga nozil bo'lgan o'sha Qur'on ekanligiga xato kirishi mumkin bo'lib qolardi, bu esa shariat nuqtai nazaridan mumkin emas; shuning uchun ular xato bir narsaga umumiy rozi bo'lishlari mumkin emas.

The second matter is that we have taken our Deen from those Companions since they are the ones who transmitted to us the very Quran that had descended upon our master Muhammad . Hence, if we assumed that a flaw were to creep into one single matter from among what they had agreed upon, this means that the flaw could creep into the Quran; in other words, the flaw could creep into the Deen which we had taken from them and this is impossible from the angle of Shari’ah. Therefore, although it would not be rationally impossible for the Companions to unanimously agree upon an erroneous matter - for this could happen since they are only human - however, this could not possibly happen to them from the Shari’ah point of view since if this were possible, it would then be possible for error to creep into the Deen. In other words, it would be possible for error to creep into the fact that this Quran that we have today is the very same Quran that descended upon our master Muhammad , and this is impossible from the Shari’ah point of view; thus, it would be impossible for them to generally consent on something erroneous.

Shuni aniq tushunish kerakki, sahobalarning muayyan hukm Shariat hukmi ekanligi haqidagi ijmo'i shunchaki bir dalilni ochib beradi; boshqacha aytganda, ushbu hukm uchun Allahning Elchisi ﷺning amali, so'zi yoki sukuti asosida chiqarilgan dalil mavjud, sahobalar hukmni naql qilgan, ammo dalilni naql qilmagan. Shuning uchun ularning hukmni naql qilishi bu hukm uchun dalil mavjudligini ko'rsatadi. Demak, ularning umumiy kelishuvi ularning shaxsiy fikrlari muayyan masalada bir xil ekanligini anglatmaydi, chunki ularning shaxsiy fikrlari Vahiy emas va ularning har biri ma'sum emas; shuning uchun sahobaning fikri Shariat dalili sifatida qabul qilinmaydi. Buning sababi shundaki, Shariat dalili Vahiy orqali keltirilgandagina Shariat dalili hisoblanadi, sahobalarning fikrlari esa bunday emas; shuning uchun ular kelishgan fikrlari bo'lsin yoki ixtilof qilgan fikrlari bo'lsin, Shariat dalili sifatida qaralmaydi. Shu sababli sahobalarning ijmo'i ularning bitta yagona fikrga kelishini anglatmaydi, balki bir hukmning Shariat hukmi ekani yoki muayyan hukmning Shariat hukmi ekani to'g'risidagi umumiy kelishuvni anglatadi; bunda bu ularning fikri emas, balki hukmning Shariatdan ekani haqidagi umumiy kelishuvdir. Demak, sahobalarning ijmo'i shunchaki dalilni ochib beradi.

However, what should be made absolutely clear is that the Ijma’ of the Companions stipulating that such and such rule is a Shari’ah rule is simply uncovering an evidence; in other words, there exists for this rule an evidence derived either from the action, words or silence of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) , and that the Companions transmitted the rule but did not transmit the evidence. Hence, their transmission of the rule discloses the fact that there exists an evidence for that rule. Therefore, their general consensus does not mean that their personal opinions are in agreement over a specific matter for their personal opinions are not Revelation and each one of them is not infallible; thus, a companion’s opinion cannot be regarded as a Shari’ah evidence. This is because the Shari’ah evidence must be brought by way of Revelation in order to be considered as Shari’ah evidence, and the Companions’ opinions are not like that; therefore, they cannot be considered as Shari’ah evidence whether these were the opinions upon which they agreed or the opinions over which they disagreed. For this reason, the Ijma’ of the Companions does not mean their agreement upon one single opinion, it rather means their general consensus about the fact that a rule is a Shari’ah rule, or such and such rule is a Shari’ah rule; in this case, it is not their opinion but rather a general consensus that it is from Shari’ah; hence, the Ijma’ of the Companions is simply uncovering an evidence.

Ushbu ikki rivoyatda Allohning Elchisi (sav) ro‘za va hajdagi Allohga bo‘lgan qarzni insonga bo‘lgan qarzga bog‘ladilar, ikkalasi ham ma’lum bir narsani boshqa ma’lum bir narsaga bog‘lashdir, ya’ni Allohga bo‘lgan qarzning insonga bo‘lgan qarz bilan bog‘lanishi, ularning o‘rnini boshqa birov tomonidan to‘ldirish kifoya qilishini tasdiqlash uchun. Bunga sabab shuki, ikkala narsa ham qarzdir; demak, ular o‘rtasidagi umumiy omil qarzdir va bu ‘illat, ikkalasi uchun tasdiqlangan hukm esa o‘rnini to‘ldirishning kifoya qilishidir. Shariat matnidan olingan Shariat bo‘yicha qiyosning haqiqati ana shudir. Shuning uchun bu ta’rif bajarilishi shart bo‘lgan Shariat hukmidir va uni chiqargan kishi uchun, shuningdek, unga ergashgan kishi uchun – dalilni tekshiradigan muttabi’ (muqallid) bo‘lsinmi yoki dalilni tekshirmaydigan ‘ammiy (muqallid) bo‘lsinmi – Allohning bog‘lovchi hukmidir. U Shariat dalilidan chiqarilgan boshqa har qanday Shariat hukmi kabidir, chunki Shariat dalillaridan chiqarilgan Shariat ta’riflari va qoidalari boshqa barcha Shariat hukmlari kabi Shariat hukmlaridir.

In these two narrations, the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) linked the debt to Allah (swt) in fasting and in Hajj onto the debt to the human and they are both the linkage of a known matter upon another known matter, i.e. the association of the debt to Allah with the debt to the human in confirming that their settlement on one’s behalf would suffice. This is so because both of these matters are debts; thus the mutual factor between them is the debt and this is the ‘Illah and the rule that has been confirmed for both of them is the sufficing of the settlement. This is the reality of Qiyas according to the Shari’ah from the Shari’ah text. Therefore, this definition is a Shari’ah rule that must be implemented and it is the binding rule of Allah upon the one who deduces it and upon the one who imitates it either as a Muttabi’ (a Muqallid who queries the evidence) or as an ‘Ammi (a Muqallid who did not query the evidence). It is like any other Shari’ah rule, deduced from a Shari’ah evidence, because the Shari’ah definitions and principles deduced from the Shari’ah evidences are Shari’ah rules like all other Shari’ah rules.

"Butun olamlarga rahmat bo'lish uchun (barcha insoniyat uchun)" (TMQ 21:107) va oldingi oyatlarning qolgani, ular sifat sifatida qaralsa ham va oyatlar ichida mavjud bo'lgan harflar yashirin illatga ishora qilsa ham, so'zlarning mazmuni illatning mavjudligini ko'rsatmaydi, chunki u yo'q bo'lishi mumkin va shariat uning uchun nozil qilinmagan. Shunga ko'ra, Islom shariati unga ishongan va shu bo'yicha amal qilgan kishi uchun rahmat bo'lishi mumkin, masalan, musulmonlarning birinchi avlodlari uchun; unga kufr keltirgan kishi uchun esa balo bo'lishi mumkin, masalan, kofirlar uchun. Shunday qilib, Payg'ambarning (pbuh) yuborilishi kofirlar uchun balo bo'lib, ular "olamlar"dan hisoblanadi. Bundan tashqari, Islom xabari bugun ham mavjud. Chunki yuborilish amalda sodir bo'lgan, shu bilan birga o'sha xabarga ishongan musulmonlar bugun qiyinchilikda yashamoqda. Demak, faqat yuborilish, ya'ni faqat shariatning mavjudligi rahmat emas, shuning uchun u uning illati emas. Bunga asoslanib, foyda olish va zararni daf etish shariat illati hisoblanmaydi; shuning uchun u qiyosga asos qilib olinmaydi.

“Mercy to the worlds (all mankind)” (TMQ 21:107) and the rest of the previous verses, even if they are considered as attributes and within the verses are the letters that would indicate an underlying Illah, the context of the words does not indicate the existence of an Illah because they could be absent and because the legislation was not for its sake. Accordingly, the Islamic Shari’ah could be a mercy for the one who believes in it and who acts according to it, such as: the first generations of Muslims, and it could be an affliction for whoever disbelieves in it, such as the disbelievers. So, the sending of the Messenger (pbuh) is an affliction upon the disbelievers and they are from the ‘Aalameen. Additionally, the Islamic message is present today. This is since the sending has practically taken place and with that the Muslims who themselves believe in that message are today in hardship. So, it is not the sending alone, that is the existence of the Shari’ah alone, that is a mercy, and for that reason it is not an Illah for it. Based upon that, attaining the benefits and repelling the harms is not a Shari’ah Illah; so, it is not taken as a basis for Qiyas.

"Sahobalarim yulduzlarga o'xshaydi, qaysi birortasiga ergashsangiz, hidoyatga erishasiz", degan hadis sahobiyning qavlini dalil sifatida qo'llab-quvvatlaydi. Bu xulosa noto'g'ri, chunki Payg'ambar ﷺ sahobalarni alohida-alohida emas, balki jamoa sifatida maqtagani sahobalar ijmoining shar'iy dalil ekanligini ko'rsatadi, va sahobalar Qur'onni alohida-alohida emas, balki jamoa bo'lib naql qilgani ularning ijmoi shar'iy dalil ekanligini isbotlaydi. Shar'iy dalil aynan ularga bildirilgan maqtov va ularning biror hukm shar'iy hukm ekanligiga jamoa bo'lib kelishganidir. Demak, dalil ikki narsadir: maqtov va ijmo, bular esa alohida sahobada topilmaydi. Shu sababli, maqtov va Qur'on naqli bilan bog'liq masalalar, Alloh ta'olo maqtagan kishilardan Qur'onni naql qilgan har bir kishining so'zi shar'iy dalil bo'ladi, deb xulosa qilish uchun yaroqli emas. Chunki Alloh ta'olo sahobalarni maqtagani kabi, ularga ergashgan kishilarni ham maqtagan. Demak, hatto Alloh maqtagan kishilar tomonidan bo'lsa ham, Qur'onning naql qilinishi uni naql qilgan kishining so'zini shar'iy dalil qilmaydi va shu sababli bu xulosa noto'g'ridir. Bu xulosaning noto'g'riligini tasdiqlaydigan narsa shuki, alohida sahobaning naql qilgani va rivoyat qilgan hadislari qat'iy emas, balki zanniy hisoblanadi. Shuning uchun, "Qari erkak va qari ayol zino qilsalar, ularni toshbo'ron qilinglar", degan so'z sahobadan naql qilingan bo'lsa ham, unga ijmo bo'lmagani uchun Qur'on oyati hisoblanmaydi. Xuddi shunday, sahobalar yakka xabarlardan naql qilgan rivoyatlar ham qat'iy emas, balki zanniy hisoblanadi.

“My companions are like stars, whoever you follow you follow guidance”, support the opinion of a companion being an evidence. This deduction is incorrect since the praise of the Prophet (pbuh) for the companions collectively not individually is a proof that the Ijma’ of the Companions is a Shari’ah evidence and the fact that the Companions did not convey the Quran individually is a proof that their consensus is a Shari’ah evidence. Rather, the Shari’ah evidence is the praise upon them and the fact that they collectively agree that a rule is the Shari’ah rule. So the evidence is two matters, praise and consensus and these are not found in the individual companion. In which case, the issue of praise and the conveyance of the Quran are not suitable to be proofs that the words of whoever conveyed the Quran from those whom Allah (swt) praised are Shari’ah evidences because in the same manner that Allah (swt) praised the Companions, He (swt) also praised those who followed them, and since the conveyance of the Quran even if by those whom Allah (swt) has praised does not make the words of the one who conveyed it a Shari’ah evidence, and due to that the inference made is invalid. What indicates the invalidity of this inference is that what an individual companion conveyed and what he narrated from the narrations is not considered to be definite – rather it is indefinite. Therefore, “When the old man and the woman commit fornication then have them stoned.” is not considered to be a verse from the Quran even though it was conveyed by a companion since there was no Ijma’ upon it. In the same manner, the narrations that are transmitted by the Companions from the singular reports are not considered definite - rather they are indefinite.

Bu, sahobalarning ijmosidan farq qiladi, chunki ular bir ovozdan Qur'on deb tan olgan narsa Qur'on hisoblanadi va qat'iydir, ular bir ovozdan rivoyatlar yuzasidan qabul qilgan va ular tomonidan mutavotir (ketma-ket ko'p silsilalar orqali) naql qilingan narsalar qat'iy dalillar hisoblanadi. Shunga ko'ra, sahobalar bir ovozdan kelishgan narsa - unda ixtilof yo'q, ya'ni u qat'iydir va uni inkor etuvchi kofir hisoblanadi - bilan yakka sahobaning rivoyat qilgan narsasi o'rtasida katta farq bor. Yakka sahobaning rivoyati esa noqat'iydir va uni inkor etuvchi kofir hisoblanmaydi. Shuning uchun sahobalarning ijmosi shar'iy dalildir, yakka sahobaning fikri esa shar'iy dalillardan hisoblanmaydi. Bundan tashqari, xatoga yo'l qo'ymaydigan sahobalarning ijmosidan farqli o'laroq, yakka sahoba xato qilishi mumkin va u xatolardan xoli emas. Sahobalar masalalarda ixtilof qilar edilar va ularning har biri boshqasidan farqli fikrni tutar edi. Agar sahobaning fikri dalil bo'lganida, Allohning (SWT) dalillari o'zaro ziddiyatli va qarama-qarshi bo'lib qolardi. Shuning uchun sahobaning fikri shar'iy dalil hisoblanmaydi.

This is different from the Ijma’ of the Companions since what they agreed upon unanimously as being from the Quran is considered to be Quran and to be definite, and what they agreed upon unanimously in terms of narrations and were transmitted from them by Mutawatir (successive multiple chains) are considered to be definite evidences. Accordingly, the difference is vast between what the Companions agreed upon unanimously - where there is no disagreement, meaning it is definite and the one who denies it is a disbeliever - and what the single companion narrated which is indefinite and the one who denies it is not considered to be a disbeliever. Therefore, Ijma’ of the Companions is Shari’ah evidence whereas the opinion of the individual companion is not considered to be from the Shari’ah evidences. In addition to that, contrary to the Ijma’ of the Companions who do not agree upon a mistake, the individual companion can make mistakes and he is not free from them. The Companions used to differ over issues and each of them adopted a different opinion from the other; so, if the opinion of the companion were a proof then the proofs of Allah (swt) would be in disagreement and contradictory. Therefore, the opinion of a companion is not considered to be Shari’ah evidence.

“(Avvalroq) men sizlarni qabrlarni ziyorat qilishdan qaytargan edim, endi esa ularni ziyorat qilinglar”; demak, oldingi hukmning bekor qilinishi va olib tashlanishi keyingi shar'iy matn orqali sodir bo‘lsa, bu nasx (bekor qilish)dir. Shunday ekan, nasx sodir bo‘lishi uchun bekor qilinadigan hukm bo‘lishi kerak, u esa bekor qiluvchi hukmdan oldin nozil bo‘lgan bo‘lishi lozim; shuningdek, bekor qiluvchi matnda aynan shu hukm uchun nasx ekanligini bildiruvchi dalil bo‘lishi kerak. Bundan boshqa har qanday holat nasx hisoblanmaydi. Ikki hukm o‘rtasidagi oddiy farq yoki ziddiyat ulardan birini ikkinchisi uchun nasx qilmaydi; balki bekor qiluvchi matnda muayyan hukm uchun nasx ekanligini ko‘rsatuvchi dalil bo‘lishi shart. Shunga ko‘ra, avvalgi shariatlardan naql qilingan bu hukmlar, ular bilan farq qiladigan yoki ziddiyat qiladigan Islom hukmlari bilan bekor qilinmaydi, chunki buni ko‘rsatuvchi hech narsa yo‘q. Bundan tashqari, ular bilan Islomning qonunchilikdagi hukmlari o‘rtasida hech qanday aloqa yo‘q; demak, ular avvalgi shariatlarning Islom shariati orqali bekor qilinishi bilan bekor bo‘ladi, ularga xos qonunlar orqali emas. Shu bilan birga, “Payg‘ambar ﷺ olib kelgan narsa bilan biz muxotabmiz va shu bilan cheklanganmiz”, degan xulosa noto‘g‘ri ekani ayon bo‘ladi. Chunki biz Islom qonunchiligidan u zot bilan bizga kelgan narsa bilan muxotabmiz va shu bilan cheklanganmiz; biz esa u zotning avvalgi payg‘ambarlar qissalari va rivoyatlaridan, shuningdek, avvalgi ummatlarning ahvolidan va ular qanday qonunlarga amal qilganidan biz uchun bayon qilganlari bilan muxotab emasmiz. Shunday qilib, bizdan oldingilarning qonunchiligi biz uchun qonun emasligi va uni Islom dalillaridan deb hisoblash noto‘g‘ri ekani aniq ayon bo‘ldi.

“(In the past) I forbade you from visiting graves, but visit them now.”; therefore, the nullification and raising of the previous rule by a subsequent Shari’ah text is abrogation. Therefore, for abrogation to take place there must be an abrogated rule that was revealed before the abrogating rule, and for an indication to be present in the abrogating text that it is an abrogation for that rule, and anything other than this is not considered to be abrogation. The mere difference between two rules or contradiction between them does not make one of them an abrogation for the other; rather, there must be an indication in the abrogating text which indicates that it is an abrogation for a specific rule. Accordingly, these rules, narrated from the previous Shara’ih, are not abrogated by the rules of Islam which differs with them or contradicts them since there is nothing which indicates that. Furthermore, there is no relationship between them and the rules of Islam in legislation; so, they are abrogated by the abrogation of the previous Shara’ih by the Shari’ah of Islam and not by laws specific to them that came to abrogate them. With this, it is clear that the inference that we are addressed by what the Messenger (pbuh) came with and are restricted by it as being an invalid inference since we are addressed by what came to us with him from the legislation of Islam and restricted by that, and we are not addressed by what he related to us from the stories of the previous Prophets and their narrations, and neither are we addressed by what he explained to us from the circumstances of the previous nations and what laws they used to follow. Accordingly, it has become apparent with clarity that the legislation of those before us is not legislation for us and the invalidity of considering it being from the Islamic evidences is also apparent.

Istihsaan ikki turga bo‘linadi: birinchisi Istihsaani qiyosiy, ikkinchisi esa zaruriy istihsaandir. Istihsaani qiyosiy – zohiriy qiyos tufayli ko‘rinib turgan hukmni tark etib, unga nisbatan yashirinroq va nozikroq bo‘lgan, ammo kuchliroq dalil, qoniqarliroq nuqtai nazar hamda to‘g‘riroq xulosaga ega bo‘lgan boshqa qiyos orqali boshqa hukmga o‘tishdir. Buning misoli: agar bir kishi ikki kishidan bir shartnoma bilan, ulardan qarz sifatida, bitta mashina sotib olgan bo‘lsa. So‘ngra ikki qarz beruvchidan biriga qarzning bir qismi berilgan bo‘lsa. Lekin u (birinchi qarz beruvchi) bu qismni aynan o‘zi uchun olish huquqiga ega emas; balki uning qarzdagi sherigi o‘z ulushini undan talab qilish huquqiga egadir, chunki u (birinchi qarz beruvchi) uni yagona sotuvdagi umumiy sotuv narxidan o‘zlashtirgan. Bundan tashqari, ikki sherikdan birining umumiy sotuv narxidan o‘zlashtirishi ikkalasining o‘zlashtirishi hisoblanadi, boshqacha aytganda, bu sheriklik uchun o‘zlashtirishdir va ulardan birining aynan o‘ziga olishi mumkin emas. Shunday ekan, agar olingan narsa ikkinchi sherik o‘z ulushini undan olishidan oldin, uni qabul qilgan kishi qo‘lida halok bo‘lsa, qiyos bo‘yicha xulosa shuki, bu zarar ikkalasining umumiy summasidan, ya’ni sheriklikning umumiy summasidan ayirilishi kerak. Lekin istihsonda zarar faqat uni qabul qilgan kishidan ko‘riladi, ikkinchi sherikka esa zarar hisobga olinmaydi, chunki asli u qabul qiluvchining sherikligidan ajralmas emas; balki u o‘zlashtiruvchi olgan narsani qoldirib, o‘zi alohida qarzdorga bog‘lanishi mumkin. Boshqa misollar ham shu tartibda davom etadi. Bu – istihsaani qiyosiydir.

Istihsaan is divided into two categories; the first is Istihsaan Qiyasi and the second is Istihsaan of necessity. Istihsaan Qiyasi is to abandon the rule of an apparent Qiyas that comes to fore for a different rule by another Qiyas which is more subtle and hidden, but is a stronger proof, with a more satisfying viewpoint and a more correct derivation. An example of this is: if a person bought a car from two people in one agreement as a loan from them. Then, one of the two creditors was given part of this debt. However, he didn’t have the right to take it specifically; rather, his partner in the debt has a right to claim his part of the receipt since he (the first creditor) has appropriated it from the combined sale price in the single sale. Moreover, the appropriation of either of the two partners from the price of the combined sale between them is the appropriation of both the partners, in other words, it is an appropriation for the partnership and it is not for either of them to take specifically. So, if whatever was taken is destroyed while it is in the possession of the one who received it before the second partner took his share from it, then the deduction from the Qiyas is that it would be taken away from the total sum of the two, or in other words, from the total sum of the partnership. However, in Istihsaan the loss would be considered to be taken only from the one who had received it and the loss would not be counted against the second partner according to Istihsaan since in origin he is not inseparable from the partnership of the one who received it; rather, he is able to leave what is received by the appropriator and become attached to the debtor by himself specifically. The other examples follow in the same manner. This is Istihsaan Qiyasi.

Istihsaan ilg'or-zarurat sababli, u Qiyos qoidasiga zid bo'lib, lozim bo'lgan zarurat yoki talab qilinadigan manfaatni hisobga olgan holda, ehtiyojni qondirish yoki mashaqqatni oldini olish maqsadida qilinadigan ishdir. Bu Qiyos qoidasi ba'zi masalalarda mashaqqat yoki muammoga olib kelganda sodir bo'ladi; shu vaqtda u mashaqqatni yo'qotuvchi va muammoni bartaraf etuvchi boshqa qoida bilan Istihsaan orqali tark etiladi. Masalan, ishchining o'zi ishlayotgan narsa bo'yicha egallashi amanat (ishonch) hisoblanadi; shuning uchun agar u beparvolik qilmagan bo'lsa, u qo'lida turgan paytda shikastlangan narsa uchun javobgarlik yo'q. Shunga ko'ra, agar kimdir o'z uyida ishlash uchun bir oylik muddatga bir kishini yollagan bo'lsa va u boshqa birovning kiyimlarini tikayotgan bo'lsa, bu ishchi xususiy ishchi hisoblanadi. Agar kiyimlar ishchining qo'lida bo'lgan paytda, undan hech qanday tajovuz bo'lmasdan, shikastlansa, u ishonch sifatida egallagani uchun tovon to'lash yo'q. Yana, agar kimdir o'z do'konida boshqalarning kiyimlarini tikish uchun bir kishini yollagan bo'lsa va u barcha odamlarning kiyimini tikib yurgan bo'lsa, bu ishchi umumiy ishchi hisoblanadi. Shunday bo'lsa-da, agar kiyimlar bu ishchining qo'lida bo'lganda, undan tajovuz bo'lmasdan yo'qolsa, u ham xuddi shu tarzda ishonch sifatida ushlagani uchun javobgarlik yo'q. Ammo Istihsaanga ko'ra, xususiy ishchida javobgarlik yo'q, umumiy ishchida esa bor. Bu shuning uchun, umumiy ishchi o'zi bajara oladiganidan ko'proq ish qabul qilmasligi kerakligi uchun, chunki u odamlarning mol-mulkini yo'qotib qo'yishi mumkin.

As for Istihsaan of necessity, it is what contradicts the rule of Qiyas by taking into account an incumbent necessity or a required benefit in order to fulfil the need or prevent the hardship. This occurs when the rule from the Qiyas leads to a hardship or a problem in some issues and so it is abandoned at that time by Istihsaan for another rule which would remove the hardship and repel the problem. This is like the example of the employee since his possession with respect to what he is employed upon is considered to be an Amanat (trust); so there is no liability (to be paid) if it is damaged while it is with him as long as he was not negligent. Therefore, if someone employed a person to work in his house to sew clothes for someone else for one month, he is considered a private employee. Then, if the clothes were damaged while they are in the employee’s possession without any transgression from him, there is no payment of liability because he possessed it as a trust. Additionally, if someone employed someone to work in his shop to sew clothes for others and he used to sew clothes for all the people, then he is a general employee. So, if the clothes are destroyed while they are in this employee’s possession without any transgression from him then there is no liability since he held them as a trust in the same manner. However, according to Istihsaan, there is no liability upon the private employee while there is for the general employee so that he (the general employee) would not accept more work than he is able to do since he might destroy the peoples’ wealth.

Istihsaan ta'riflarining barchasi noto'g'ri. Birinchi ta'rifga ko'ra, dalil mujtahidning ongida sezilgan bo'lib, u nima ekanligini bilmaydi. Biror narsani dalil deb hisoblash, u noma'lum ekan, joiz emas, chunki uni aniq va ravshan bayon qila olmaslik uning mujtahid uchun aniq emasligini va unga bilimi yo'qligini isbotlaydi; shuning uchun u Shariat dalillaridan bo'lishi to'g'ri emas. Boshqa ta'riflarning barchasi bir xil ma'noni anglatadi, ya'ni o'xshash masalani boshqa, kuchliroq qarash uchun tark etish, boshqacha aytganda, qiyosni kuchliroq dalil uchun tark etish. Agar bu ta'riflar "kuchliroq dalil" deganda Kitob yoki Sunnatdagi matnni nazarda tutsa, bu istihsaan emas, balki matnni tarjih qilishdir. Demak, bu Kitob yoki Sunnat orqali amalga oshadigan istidlol bo'lib, istihsaan orqali emas. Agar "kuchliroq dalil" deganda aql nazarda tutilsa, ya'ni aql foyda deb hisoblagan narsa nazarda tutilsa, bu ham noto'g'ri, chunki qiyos Shariat illatiga asoslanadi, bu illat matn bilan belgilanadi va u Shariatning (Allohning, subhanahu va taolo) bizga qaratgan xitobidir. Aql va foyda Shariat matnlari emas, shuningdek ular matndan kuchliroq boshqa illat ham emas; aksincha, aql va foydaning Shariat matni, ya'ni vahiy bilan hech qanday aloqasi yo'q. Shu sababli bu tark etish ham noto'g'ri.

With respect to the explanations of Istihsaan, all of them are invalid. As for the first explanation that the evidence is sensed in the mind of the Mujtahid and that he or she does not know what it is, it is not permitted to consider something an evidence as long as it remains unknown since the lack of ability to make it clear and apparent proves that it is not clear to the Mujtahid and that he or she lacks knowledge of it; so, it is not correct to be from amongst the Shari’ah evidences. As for the other explanations, all of their meanings are the same, i.e. to abandon similar issues to the issue at hand for another stronger view, in other words, to abandon Qiyas for stronger evidence. If these explanations intend by the “stronger evidence”, a text from the Book or the Sunnah, then this is not Istihsaan; it is rather preference of the text, so it is deducing from the text which would be deduction by the Book or the Sunnah and not deduction by Istihsaan. If the “stronger evidence” is the mind by what it considers as benefit and this is the intended meaning, then this is invalid since Qiyas is built upon the Shari’ah ‘Illah which is determined by the text and it is the address of the Legislator (swt) to us. The mind and the benefit are not Shari’ah texts and nor are they another ‘Illah stronger than the text; rather, there is no relationship between the mind and benefit with the Shari’ah text (i.e. what came as Revelation). For that reason, this abandonment is invalid.

Istihsan qiyosiy turining haqsizligi ikkinchi izohning haqsizligidan aniq bo‘ldi, ya’ni o‘xshash masalalarni tark etish ma’nosidagi izohning. Shuningdek, ularning uni yashirin qiyos deb hisoblashi ham haqsizdir, chunki u qiyos bilan hech qanday aloqaga ega emas; aksincha, u shunchaki manfaat bo‘yicha fikr yuritishdir (manfaatni ‘illat qilib olishdir). Birgalikda bitim bilan bir shartnomada sotilgan narx haqidagi misolga kelsak, sheriklardan biri o‘zlashtirgan mol yo‘qotilganda hukmni farqlash to‘g‘ri emas: ya’ni bu sheriklikning mol-mulkidan yo‘qotish hisoblanadi, chunki sheriklardan birining mol-mulkdan o‘zlashtirgani sheriklikning o‘zlashtirishidandir. Chunki mol – sotilgan mashinami yoki uning narximi, farqi yo‘q – sheriklikning molidir, sheriklardan birining molidir emas; shuning uchun uning yo‘qolishi sheriklik molining yo‘qolishidir, xuddi uning o‘zlashtirilishi sheriklik molini o‘zlashtirish bo‘lgani kabi. Demak, bu manfaatga asoslangan tark etishning o‘rni yo‘q va u Shariat bilan ziddir.

This is regarding the explanations. As for the categorisation of Istihsaan, the invalidity of Istihsaan Qiyasi has become clear from the invalidity of the second explanation, which was to abandon the similar issues to the issue. Also, their consideration that it is a hidden Qiyas is invalid because it has no relationship with Qiyas; rather, it is simply reasoning by benefit (making the benefit an ‘Illah). Regarding the example of the price of a combined sale which was sold in one agreement, it is not correct to differ in the rule, the loss of the wealth which one of the two partners appropriated, that it is a loss from the wealth of the partnership, for what one of the two partners appropriated from the wealth is from the appropriation of the partnership. Because the wealth, irrespective of whether it was the sold car or its price, is the wealth of the partnership and not the wealth of one of the partners; so its loss is the loss of the wealth of the company just like its appropriation is an appropriation of the wealth of the company. So, this beneficial (Maslahi) abandonment has no place and it contradicts the Shari’ah.

Al-Masalih al-Mursalah ta'rifi: shariatda unga yoki uning turiga oid hech qanday matn rivoyat qilinmagan har qanday manfaatdir. Demak, "mursalah" so'zining ma'nosi shuki, u dalilda zikr etilmagan. Ular aytdilar: agar maslahatning o'zi aniq bir matnda zikr etilgan bo'lsa, masalan, ta'lim berish, o'qish va yozish, yoki uning turini zikr etgan umumiy matndan bo'lsa, u holda uning e'tiborga olinishini tasdiqlovchi, masalan, har qanday yaxshilikka buyurish va barcha yomon ishlardan qaytarish, bu ikki holatda u Al-Masalih al-Mursalahdan hisoblanmaydi. Balki Al-Masalih al-Mursalah dalildan kelib chiqadi, ya'ni unga oid hech qanday dalil topilmaydi; aksincha, u manfaatlarni qo'lga kiritish va zararlarni qaytarish uchun yuborilgan shariatning umumiy mazmunidan keltirib chiqariladi. Shu bilan birga, shariat manfaatlari bilan noqonuniy manfaatlar o'rtasida farq qilinadi: shariat manfaatlari shariatning maqsadlariga (Maqasid) mos keladigan manfaatlardir, noqonuniy manfaatlar esa shariatning maqsadlariga zid keladigan manfaatlardir. Shunday ekan, shariat dalili hisoblangan Al-Masalih al-Mursalah — bu shariatning maqsadlariga mos keladiganlaridir, shariatning maqsadlariga zid keladiganlari esa Al-Masalih al-Mursalahdan hisoblanmaydi va natijada shariat dalili emas. Demak, Al-Masalih al-Mursalah — bu shariat matnlari uning e'tiborga olinishini umumiy tarzda ko'rsatgan manfaatlardir. Shunga ko'ra, voqea yoki unga o'xshash narsa haqida shariat matni bo'lmagan hollarda, aniq shariat hukmlari shu asosda quriladi, bunda manfaatning o'zi shariat dalili bo'ladi.

Al-Masalih Al- Mursalah may be defined as: every interest which has no text narrated in the Shari’ah with respect to it or its type. So, the meaning of Mursalah is that it is not mentioned in evidence. They said that if the Maslahah was itself mentioned in a specific text, such as teaching, reading and writing, or was from a general text which mentioned its type which confirmed its consideration, such as the enjoining of every type of good and the forbiddance of all the acts of evil, then in these two situations it is not considered to be from Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah. Rather, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah is forwarded from the evidence, in other words, there is no evidence found upon it; instead, it is derived from the generality of the Shari’ah being sent to gain the interests and repel the harms. However, there is a difference made between the Shari’ah interests and those which are not legitimate since the Shari’ah interests are those that agree with the intentions (Maqasid) of the Shari’ah, and the interests that are illegitimate are those which contradict the intentions of the Shari’ah. So, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah that are considered to be a Shari’ah evidence are those which agree with the intentions of the Shari’ah, and those which contradict with the intentions of the Shari’ah are not considered to be from Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah; consequently, it is not a Shari’ah evidence. Hence, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah are those that the Shari’ah texts indicate its consideration in a general manner, and accordingly, specific Shari’ah rules are built upon its basis when there is no Shari’ah text regarding the event or anything which is comparable to it, in which case the interest would be the Shari’ah proof.

«Va qalbləri ulfatga keltirilganlar uchun» (TMQ 9:60). U (subhanahu va taolo) faqat maqsadni (illatni) aniqlab bermoqda: boylar o‘rtasida boylikning aylanib yurishini oldini olish uchun mol-mulkni boylarga emas, balki kambag‘allarga taqsimlash kerakligini; Payg‘ambar ﷺning Zaynabga uylanishining illati esa o‘g‘il bola deb olingan kishining xotiniga uylanish mumkinligini bayon qilish ekanligini; hamda qalblarni jalb qilish maqsadida berishning illati davlatning qalblarni bir-biriga bog‘lash ehtiyoji ekanligini aniqlab bermoqda. Demak, U (subhanahu va taolo) bu narsani foyda deb tushuntirmagan; balki, aniq bir masala muayyan hukmning illati ekanligi bayon qilingan, foyda yoki uning yo‘qligiga hech qanday e’tibor berilmagan va umuman unga hech qanday ahamiyat qaratilmagan. Shunday ekan, Shariat bu sabablarni qay jihatdan ko‘rsatgan deb aytish mumkinki, shu sababli manfaatlar shariat dalili sifatida hisobga olinsin? Agar shariat matnlari shariat manfaat uchun kelganini na hukmga ko‘rsatmalarida, na hukmning illatiga ko‘rsatmalarida bildirmagan bo‘lsa, unda matnlar muayyan manfaatlarni yoki ularning turlarini ko‘rsatadi deyish mumkin emas, chunki shariat matnlarida bu haqda hech narsa kelmagan. Shunga ko‘ra, shariat matnlari muayyan manfaatlar yoki ularning turlari uchun dalil bo‘lib kelgan degan da’voning batilligi ayon bo‘ldi; undan ham muhimroq xulosa shuki, shariat matnida zikr qilinmagan va shariat dalillari sifatida ko‘rsatilmagan manfaatlar ham e’tiborga olinmaydi.

“And those whose hearts are to be conciliated.” (TMQ 9:60), He (swt) is only clarifying the ‘Illah distributing the wealth amongst the poor rather than the rich in order to prevent the circulation of the wealth amongst the rich, and clarifying that the ‘Illah of marrying the Messenger (pbuh) to Zaynab is to be an explanation of the permissibility for someone to marry his adopted son’s wife, and clarifying that the Illah for giving (money) in order to attract the hearts is the need for the State to bind the hearts together. So, He (swt) did not explain that this was benefit; rather, the explanation was that a specific issue was the Illah of a specific rule without any regard given to the interest or its absence and absolutely without any consideration to it. So, from what angle then, can it be said that the Shari’ah indicates these reasons such that the interests can be considered Shari’ah evidence? If the Shari’ah texts did not indicate that the Shari’ah came for the interest, neither in its indications upon the rule nor in its indications for the Illah of the rule, then it is not possible for it to be said that the texts indicate specific interests or by their type since nothing at all came regarding this in the Shari’ah texts. Accordingly, the invalidity of the claim that the Shari’ah texts came as a proof for specific interests or by their type has become clear, and from greater reasoning, the interests that were not mentioned by a text from the Shari’ah that indicates that they are from the Shari’ah evidences are also not considered.

Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah ni maqosid ash-shari'ah dan anglab olinishi haqida: maqosid ash-shari'ah shariat matni emas, shuning uchun undan anglab olingan narsani dalil sifatida qabul qilish mumkin emas, va uni shariat hukmlarini isbotlash uchun dalil sifatida ishlatishda hech qanday ahamiyat yo'q. Bundan tashqari, maqosid ash-shari'ah nimani anglatadi? Agar undan maqsad matnlar ko'rsatgan narsa bo'lsa, masalan zino, o'g'rilik, qotillik, spirtli ichimliklar va islomdan qaytish (murtad bo'lish) ni taqiqlash bo'lsa, u holda bu shariatning maqsadi emas, balki bandaning amallariga oid hukmdir va matnning ko'rsatmasidan tashqariga o'tishning hojati yo'q. Demak, matndan anglab olingan bu hukmni shariat dalili deb hisoblashga o'rin yo'q, balki u shariat hukmidir. Aql xayoli bu hukmdan shariat dalillaridan shariatning maqsadi deb tasavvur qilgan narsasiga hisob berilmaydi, bu esa undan ham muhimroq. Shunday ekan, oddiy xayoldan tasavvur qilingan narsani shariatning maqsadi sifatida qanday qilib shariat dalili deb hisoblash mumkin?! Shunga asoslanib, maqosid ash-shari'ahdan anglab olinganning haqiqiyligi butunlay va to'liq batil hisoblanadi.

With respect to Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah being understood from the intentions of the Shari’ah, the intentions of the Shari’ah are not a Shari’ah text which can be understood such that what is understood from them can be considered a proof, and so there is no value in what is understood from them as far as using them as evidence for Shari’ah law. Furthermore, what is meant by the intentions of the Shari’ah? If what is intended by it is what the texts indicate, such as the prohibitions of fornication, stealing, murder, alcohol and apostasy from Islam, then this is not an intention of the Shari’ah; rather, it is the law for the actions of the worshipper and there is no looking beyond the indication of the text. So, there is no place to consider that this law which was understood from the text is Shari’ah evidence; rather, it is a Shari’ah rule. By greater reasoning, there is no account given to what the mind imagines from that law as being the purpose of the Shari’ah to be from the Shari’ah evidences. So, how would you consider that which is conceived from the mere imagination as a purpose of the Shari’ah to be a Shari’ah evidence?!! Based upon this, the validity of what is understood from the intentions of the Shari’ah is completely and utterly void.

Shuning uchun, bu dalillardan chiqarilgan har bir hukm ularni Shariat dalili deb hisoblovchilar nazarida ham, ularga qarshi chiquvchilar nazarida ham Shariat hukmi hisoblanadi. Biroq u faqat uni chiqargan kishi uchun majburiy Shariat hukmidir, boshqacha tushunchaga ega bo‘lgan kishi uchun esa majburiy emas. Bu matnlardan chiqarilgan hukmlarga o‘xshaydi: matnni tushunishdagi farq chiqarilgan hukmni uni chiqargan kishi nazarida Shariat hukmiga, unga shu tushunishda qarshi chiqqan kishi nazarida esa noqonuniy hukmga aylantirmaydi. Aksincha, matndan shunday tushunishga erishish mumkin bo‘lgan ekan, ya’ni shubhali dalil (Shubhat Daleel) mavjud ekan, u barcha musulmonlar nazarida Shariat hukmidir. Lekin u barcha musulmonlar uchun majburiy hukm emas, balki faqat uni chiqargan kishi va unga ergashgan kishi uchun majburiydir, unga qarshi chiqqan kishi uchun esa majburiy emas. Shunga qaramay, har holda u Shariat hukmidir. Xuddi shuningdek, dalildan chiqarilgan hukm matndan chiqarilgan hukmga aynan o‘xshaydi: uni Shariat dalili deb hisoblagan kishilar uchun ham, uni Shariat dalili deb hisoblamagan kishilar uchun ham, shubhali dalil mavjud bo‘lgan sharoitda, barcha musulmonlar nazarida Shariat hukmi hisoblanadi, xuddi biz Shariat dalili sifatida qabul qilinishini rad etgan oldingi dalillar holatidagidek.

Hence, every rule deduced from any of these evidences is considered a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of those who advocate that what the rule has been deduced from is part of the Shari’ah evidences and in the eyes of those who oppose it as well. However, it is only a binding Shari’ah rule upon the one who deduces it and not binding upon the one who holds a different understanding. This is like the rules deduced from the texts since the difference in understanding the text does not make the deduced rule a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of the one who deduced it and illegitimate in the eyes of the one that opposed him or her in this understanding. Rather, it is a Shari’ah rule from the viewpoint of all the Muslims as long as the possibility of reaching such understanding from the text is possible; in other words, as long as the doubted evidence (Shubhat Daleel) exists. However, it is not considered a binding rule upon all the Muslims but only binding upon the one who has deduced it and the one who has emulated it, and not binding upon the one who has opposed it. Nonetheless, in any case it is a Shari’ah rule. Likewise, the rule deduced from an evidence is exactly like the rule deduced from the text; it is considered a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of all the Muslims whether for those who considered it a Shari’ah evidence or for those who did not consider it a Shari’ah evidence, provided the doubted evidence is existent, such as in the case of the previous evidences which we refuted their consideration as the Shari’ah evidences.