这是指由圣训确立了一条律例,使得必须违背类比(القياس),并舍弃该类比,这种情况属于诸多具体情形之一。例如,关于忘记进食或饮水而斗胆属于有效斗胆的规定,便是一个例子。类比本应要求斗胆被破坏,但由于有文本指明斗胆有效,哈乃斐学派在此情形中舍弃了类比。

This is when a Hukm is established by the Sunnah that makes it necessary to oppose the Qiyaas and to reject it, within a reality from amongst the realities. An example of this is found in what has been narrated in relation to the validity of fasting when food or drink is consumed accidently. The Qiyaas dictated the breaking of the fast however the presence of the text guiding to the validity of the fast made the Hanafiyah reject the Qiyaas within this context.

哈narafiyyah的另一个例子涉及礼拜中大声笑出声时乌都的失效问题。按照类比推理（Qiyaas），应当只是礼拜本身失效，因为缺陷或瑕疵仅在于礼拜本身。如果缺陷存在于有条件约束的事物（Mashroot，即礼拜）中，那么这种缺陷（Khalal）不会延伸到作为条件的乌都（Shart）。然而，使乌都失效的是圣训（Sunnah），因为先知ﷺ裁定：那些因为看到一个盲人跌倒而在礼拜中大声笑出的人，他们的乌都失效。

Another example in respect to the Hanafiyah relates to the invalidation of the Wudoo’ and the loud burst of laughter during the Salaah. Qiyaas dictates that the Salaah alone is invalidated as the fault or defect lay in it alone. And if the fault lay in the Mashroot (conditioned matter) which is the Salaah that fault (Khalal) does not extend beyond that to the Shart (condition) which is the Wudoo’. However, that which nullifies the Wudoo’ is the Sunnah because the Nabi (saw) declared the Wudoo’ of those who had laughed out loud in their Salaah as a result of seeing a blind man tumble to be invalidated.

因此,在这两种情形中,取自Sunnah的Istihsaan与Qiyaas相悖,所以取Sunnah而不取Qiyaas。

Consequently, the Istihsaan taken from the Sunnah is in opposition to the Qiyaas in these two scenarios and consequently the Sunnah is taken and not the Qiyaas.

这意味着，如果在某个问题（Mas'alah）上已经达成了Ijmaa'（一致意见），而该一致意见所指向的结论与Qiyaas（类比推理）所得出的结论不同，那么就应当放弃该问题中的Qiyaas。

This means leaving the Qiyaas in a Mas’alah (issue) due to the convening of an Ijmaa’ upon other than what the Qiyaas led to within that issue.

这类似于穆斯林对定制契约（Istisnaa’，即订购某物以便制造）之有效性的一致同意（Ijmaa’）。例如，你与木匠约定为你制作一个特定样式的衣柜，就属于这种情形。若依据类比（Qiyaas），此种契约是不被允许的，因为该契约（‘Aqd）所针对的标的物尚不存在，而立法者（Ash-Shaari’）曾禁止就不存在之物订立契约。

That is like the Ijmaa’ of the Muslims upon the validity of the contract of Istisnaa’ (ordering something to be manufactured). This would be like your agreement with a carpenter to make a wardrobe for you of a particular description. Qiyaas would not permit that because the matter the agreement (i.e. the contract (‘Aqd)) is being made upon that which does not exist in the case where the Shaari’ (legislator) has prohibited the contract upon that which does not exist.

在此，Istihsaan（伊斯提哈桑）体现于采纳Ijmaa'（公议）——公议认可Istisnaa'（订制合同）的合法性；而这与Qiyaas（类比推理）相悖，类比推理认为，就像上例中的衣柜那样，对尚不存在之物订立此类合同是不合法的。

Here the Istihsaan is reflected in taking from the Ijmaa’ which states the permissibility of Istisnaa’ (manufacturing) and is contrary to the Qiyaas that states the impermissibility of convening such a contract upon that which does not exist, like the wardrobe in the above example.

哈乃斐学派采用这一原则："必要性使被禁止的事物变为允许"（Ad-Darooraat Tubeehu l-Mahzhooraat）。因此，当穆贾台希德（Mujtahid）在某个问题中发现存在必要性（Daroorah）时，他会舍弃类比推理（Qiyaas），依据"必要性使被禁止的事物变为允许"这一原则行事。例如，土地和水井的净化问题：若依据类比推理，就无法净化它们，因为向水池或水井中注水并不能使其洁净，注入的水一接触到纳贾斯（Najas，不洁之物）便会变得不洁，正如水桶接触到水后，水桶本身也会变成不洁之物而返回不洁的状态。因此，出于需要的必要性，他们运用istihsaan（善意推定/优选），舍弃依照类比推理行事的做法。

The Hanafiyah adopt the Qaa’idah (principle): ‘Ad-Darooraat Tubeehu l-Mahzhooraat’ (The necessities make the prohibited matters permissible). So when or if the Mujtahid found a Daroorah (necessity) within a Mas’alah (issue) he would leave the Qiyaas and adopt in accordance to the dictates of the Qaa’idah: ‘The necessities make the prohibited matters permissible’. An example of this is the purifying of the land and the wells because it is not possible to purify them when we have adopted Qiyaas. That is because it is not possible to pour water upon the basin or well for it to be purified as the water entering the basin or well becomes impure upon coming into contact with the Najas just as the bucket becomes impure by coming into contact with the water and returns as being Najas (impure). Therefore, due to necessity of the need they utilised Istihsaan to abandon working in accordance to the dictates of the Qiyaas.

fuqahaa'（伊斯兰教法学家）认为，水井或水池可以通过舀出大量的水来净化，所舀出的水量应与污秽物（najaasah）的量相当；通过反复舀水和注水（即换水），污秽物所占的比例逐渐降低，即使未能完全清除，水也可以被净化。

The Fuqahaa’ evaluated that the well or water basin would be purified by scooping out a large number of bucketfuls of water corresponding to the (amount of) Najaasah (impurity) until, by repeating the scooping and pouring (i.e. replacing), the proportion of the Najaasah is lessened, even if it is not completely removed.

这符合哈乃斐学派的观点：放弃要求彻底去除污秽的类比（Qiyaas），而采用"伊斯提哈撒尼·阿达鲁拉"（Istihsaan Ad-Daroorah），即容忍某些残留的污秽（Najaasah）。哈乃斐学派认为，Istihsaan 与 Qiyaas 相对立，就前两类而言——"圣行的伊斯提哈撒尼"（Istihsaan As-Sunnah）和"公议的伊斯提哈撒尼"（Istihsaan Al-Ijmaa'）——它们代表的是包含沙里尔"伊莱"（Shar'iyah 'Ilal，即法理依据）的文本与同一问题（Mas'alah）中来自圣训和公议的其他文本之间的冲突。学者们研究了这一冲突并为此确立了原则（Qawaa'id），我们将在《Al-Waadih Fee Usool ul-Fiqh》的第二部分讨论这些原则，如果真主意愿。这些原则包括：通指与特指（Al-'Umoom wal-Khusoos）、例外（Al-Istithnaa'）、冲突（At-Ta'aadul）以及权衡（At-Taraaajeeh）。

This is accordance to the opinion of the Hanafiyah in respect to leaving the Qiyaas that dictates removing the Najaasah (completely) whilst adopting Istihsaan Ad-Daroorah that overlooks some of the Najaasah (impurity) remaining. The opposition of Istihsaan to Qiyaas according to the Hanafiyah in regards to the first two types: ‘Istihsaan As-Sunnah’ and ‘Istihsaan Al-Ijmaa’’, represents a conflict between texts which contain Shar’iyah ‘Ilal (reasons) and other texts within the same issue (Mas’alah) from the Sunnah and Ijmaa’. The ‘Ulamaa’ have examined this conflict and have placed down principles (Qawaa’id) for it, which we will discuss in the second part of ‘Al-Waadih Fee Usool ul-Fiqh’ Inshaa Allah. These principles are like of the ‘Umoom and the Khusoos, the Istithnaa’ and At-Ta’aadul and At-Taraaajeeh.