第一位坚定确立这一方法支柱的人是伊玛目沙斐仪,他在其《Risaalah》中撰写了这一领域的内容,该书属于法理学(Usool ul-Fiqh)学科。这一方法的特点在于确立“Qawaa’id Al-Usooliyah”(法理原则),以纯理论的方式加以验证,并彻底考察这些原则所包含的分歧与差异,而不考虑任何教法学派(Madh’hab)。因此,其目的在于提炼出最有力的原则,无论这些原则是服务于某一教法学派,还是与之相反。这是因为它支配着教法学(Fiqh),而不是从属于教法学。遵循此方法的人很少会去关注具体的分支问题,除非是为了进一步阐明或举例说明(Dr. Al-‘Abd Khaleel Abu ‘Eid 所著《Mabaahith Fee Usool ul-Fiqh》第26页)。

The first one to firmly lay down the pillars of this method was Al Imaam Ash-Shaafi’iy in his Risaalah which was written in the subject area of Usool ul-Fiqh. This method is distinguished in respect to establishing the Qawaa’id Al-Usooliyah, verifying them in a purely theoretical manner, conducting a thorough examination of what they include in terms of disagreement or difference without paying consideration to any Madh’hab. The aim of it is therefore to produce the strongest principles whether that would be in service of a particular Madh’hab or was in opposition to it. That is because it dominates over the Fiqh and is not subservient to it. It was rare that those following this Tareeqah would preoccupy themselves with the branches unless this was to provide further clarity or provide examples (‘Mabaahith Fee Usool ul-Fiqh’ by Dr. Al-‘Abd Khaleel Abu ‘Eid p26).

因此,这一学派中有人在某些问题上与沙斐仪意见相左,即便他们本身是沙斐仪学派的追随者。例如,我们看到沙斐仪没有采纳沉默的共识(Al-Ijmaa’ As-Sukootiy)作为依据,而同属沙斐仪学派的阿马迪却认为沉默的共识是一种可以作为证据和依据的论证(Hujjah),并以此为优先的观点。

Consequently, there were those of this Tareeqah who disagreed with Ash-Shaafi’iy (in areas) even if they were followers of his Madh’hab. So for instance we saw that Ash-Shaafi’iy did not take Al-Ijmaa’ As Sukootiy whilst Al-Aamadi who was of the Shaaf’iy Madh’hab outweighed that Al-Ijmaa’ As-Sukootiy is a Hujjah (proof and source).

这一方法使伊斯兰教法根源学（Usool ul-Fiqh）从中受益，其中的根源原则并未服从于对某一学派（Madh'hab）的偏袒。相反，它以学术且深入的方式进行研究，并以精确和周密的考察为依归。因此，正确而有力的原则由此产生，这些原则建立在确凿明确的证据或论据（Baraaheen）之上。

This Tareeqah (method) benefited Usool ul-Fiqh and the Usooli principles were not subservient to partisanship to the Madh’hab. Rather it was studied in a ‘Ilmiy and deep manner and was subservient to precision and thorough examination. As such correct and strong principles resulted from that built upon definite clear evidences or proofs (Baraaheen).

示例:

Example:

我现在将为你讲述哈姆巴勒学派在乌苏勒·菲格赫（伊斯兰法理学原理）中确立或证实一条法则（Qaa'idah）的方法。这段内容取自伊玛目穆瓦法格·丁·阿卜杜拉·伊本·艾哈迈德·伊本·古达麦·麦格迪西（卒于伊历630年）所著的乌苏勒·菲格赫著作《拉乌达·安-纳兹尔·瓦·詹纳特·乌勒-马纳兹尔》。此法遵循穆太凯立敏（辩证神学家）的方法论。

I will now relate to you the manner of establishing or affirming a Qaa’idah (principle) from the Qawaa’id of Usool ul-Fiqh undertaken by the Hanaabilah taken from the book ‘Raudat An-Nazhar Wa Jannat ul-Manaazhir’ in Usool ul-Fiqh authored by Al-Imaam Muwaffiq ud-Deen Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Qudaamah Al Maqdasiy who passed away in the year 630 AH. This was upon the Tareeqah (methodology) of the Mutakallimeen:

麦地那人的伊杰玛尔（Ijmaa'，公议）不是希贾（Hujjah，证据/依据）。

The Ijmaa’ of Ahl-ul-Madinah (the people of Madinah) is not a Hujjah (proof/source of evidence).

“麦地那人的伊ijmaa'（公议）并非定论（Hujjah）。马立克认为它是定论，因为麦地那是知识（‘Ilm）的源头，是启示（Wahi）降临之地，圣门弟子的后代也居住在那里。因此，他们的一致意见不可能是在伊斯兰之外的其他事物上，他们也不可能偏离其所坚持的立场……”他接着说：“他们所说的真理（Haqq）不可能离开他们，这一说法是有待评估的。这是指在一种情况下：一个人在旅途中或在麦地那听闻了先知穆罕默德ﷺ的圣训，却在传给他人之前离开了这一圣训，这并非不可能。而麦地那的优越性也不要求其居民必须形成公议。因为麦加比麦地那更优越，但它在公议问题上并无影响。如果麦地那人的公议被视为定论，那么它就应当在任何时代都构成定论。然而，对于他们的这一说法在我们当今时代不可被依据、更遑论被视为公议，人们并无异议或分歧。”

“The Ijmaa’ of Ahl-ul-Madinah is not a Hujjah and Maalik said that it is a Hujjah because it represents the source of knowledge (‘Ilm), the home of the Wahi and the children of the Sahaabah resided within it. As such it is impossible for their agreement to be upon other than it (i.e. Islaam) and for them to go outside from what they were upon...” He then says: “And their statement that it is impossible for the Haqq (truth) to leave them is judged (evaluated). This is in the case where it is not impossible for a man to hear a Hadeeth from the Nabi (saw) whilst travelling or in Al-Madinah and then leave it before transmitting it to others and the merits of Al-Madinah do not oblige the convening of an Ijmaa’ (consensus) by its people. For verily Makkah is better than it and it has no trace (or impact) in respect to the Ijmaa’ and their Ijmaa’, if it was to be considered a Hujjah, would have been obliged to represent a Hujjah in all times. This is whilst there is no difference or disagreement in respect to their statement not being relied upon in this current time of ours let alone it being regarded as an Ijmaa”.

在这个例子中，伊本·古达马（Ibn Qudaamah）因此运用理性或智识上的判断，来确定并论证麦地那居民的伊杰玛尔（Ijmaa'）不是一个Hujjah（证据），而马立克学派（Maaliki Madh'hab）的追随者或支持者却将其视为证据。

In this example Ibn Qudaamah therefore used rational or an intellectual judgement to affirm or establish that the Ijmaa’ of Ahl-ul Madinah is not a Hujjah which had been taken by the followers or proponents of the Maaliki Madh’hab as a Hujjah.