这一规定涵盖并包括所有受托之人，无论他是私人雇用的雇工，还是公共雇用的雇工。因此，舍弃明确的证据（Daleel）而凭借istihsaan（认为更好）作出裁决，便等同于依据私欲与随意的念头（Hawaa）作出裁决，也等同于依据理智所认为的公益（Maslahah）作出裁决。

This covers and includes everyone who has been entrusted whether he was a private hired hand or a public hired hand. As such abandoning the Daleel and then passing judgment by way of Istihsaan reflects passing judgment based on Hawaa (a desire of whim) and by what the mind has viewed to represent a Maslahah (interest).

由此可见,所谓的"以需要(Daroorah)和公益(Maslahah)为依据的istihsaan(立法善断)"并不构成一个沙里尔证据(Daleel Shar'iy),反而表明其是在舍弃沙里尔证据(Daleel Ash-Shar'iy),而采纳理智(‘Aql)所认为的公益(Maslahah)或需要(Daroorah)。

From that it becomes clear that what has been called the Istihsaan of Daroorah and Maslahah does not represent a Daleel Shar’iy but rather it reflects the abandoning of the Daleel Ash-Shar’iy and adopting what the ‘Aql (mind) views to be a Maslahah or Daroorah (necessity).

尽管如此,那些采用istihsaan(istihsān)的伊玛目(Imaams)所推演出的律例,仍被视为伦理性的沙里亚律例(Ahkaam Shar’iyah),因为这些学者采用istihsaan,是基于他们认为它属于一种依托于疑似证据(Shubhat Daleel)的沙里亚证据(Daleel Shar’iy)。

Despite this, the Ahkaam that the A’immah (Imaams) who adopt Istihsaan have deduced are considered to be representative of Ahkaam Shar’iyah because those Scholars have adopted Istihsaan upon their consideration that it represents a Daleel Shar’iy reliant upon a Shubhat Daleel.